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Abstract 
This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the externalities of credit default 
swaps (CDS). We find that a firm’s leverage is lower when a larger proportion of its 
revenue is derived from CDS-referenced customers. This finding is robust to alternative 
samples and measures, placebo tests, and the selection of customers by suppliers. 
Moreover, firms affected by customer CDS trading issue equity to lower leverage, and 
their equity issuance costs are lower. These findings are consistent with the view that 
CDS trading on customers improves the information environment for suppliers. 
Therefore, while many firms are not directly linked to CDS trading, CDS trading on their 
customers has spillover effects on these firms’ financial policies. 
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larger proportion of its revenue is derived from CDS-referenced customers. 
This finding is robust to alternative samples and measures, placebo tests, 
and the selection of customers by suppliers. Moreover, firms affected by 
customer CDS trading issue equity to lower leverage, and their equity 
issuance costs are lower. These findings are consistent with the view that 
CDS trading on customers improves the information environment for 
suppliers. Therefore, while many firms are not directly linked to CDS 
trading, CDS trading on their customers has spillover effects on these firms’ 
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1. Introduction 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are among the most influential and controversial 
financial innovations in recent decades. 1  They provide opportunities for credit risk 
transfer, facilitating both risk-sharing and risk-taking. A burgeoning strand of literature 
shows that CDS have a pervasive impact on the reference firms, including their 
borrowing costs, capital structure, and bankruptcy risk. A large part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act provides new regulations of CDS, such as central clearing and measures aimed to 
improve market functioning and transparency. However, CDS exist only for a handful of 
large firms. For most firms, CDS seem to constitute a remote issue that is not directly 
relevant to them. Is the influence of CDS only limited to those CDS-referenced firms? In 
this paper, we empirically examine potential spillover effects or externalities of CDS 
trading.  
We focus on one key stakeholder of the CDS-referenced firms: their suppliers. 
Suppliers in the upstream of the supply chain are usually smaller firms without CDS 
trading, yet their direct economic interests in their customers provide an ideal setting 
for our analysis of CDS externalities. Suppliers should be concerned with their major 
customers regarding relationship-specific exposures such as trade credit and product 
market stability (Titman, 1984; Stulz, 1996). CDS signal changes in the creditworthiness 
of debtors much faster than credit ratings do (International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), 2012). CDS spreads can help Chief Financial Officers and 
treasurers differentiate relative credit quality across a collection of entities, especially 
for nonfinancial companies. For many CFOs, CDS have become a standard tool for 
assessing the credit quality of customers.2 
If the CDS market provides information about customers, then suppliers face a 
better information environment and can adjust their corporate policies accordingly. 
Because equity issuance is sensitive to information asymmetry, improved information 
                                                          
1 CDS are similar to insurance contracts. The buyer pays a periodic fee to the seller for a contingent 
payment linked to a reference entity’s credit events. As of December 2012, there was a total of $25 trillion 
in CDS notional value outstanding, as reported by the Bank for International Settlements. Stulz (2010) 
discusses the role of CDS in the credit crisis. Regulators in the U.S. and E.U. are currently implementing 
new rules for CDS. 
2  See, e.g., “Wrong price signals sent by CDS”, CFO Insight, June 12, 2012 (retrieved from 
http://www.cfo-insight.com/risk-management-it/hedging/wrong-price-signals-sent-by-cds/), and “Do 
CDS spreads tell the truth?” CFO Magazine, May 19, 2011 (http://ww2.cfo.com/banking-capital-
markets/2011/05/do-cds-spreads-tell-the-truth-2/). 
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can lower issuance costs and facilitate equity issuance, resulting in lower firm leverage. 
Moreover, as a new facility for price discovery, CDS trading can reflect information 
about a customer’s bankruptcy risk that is otherwise not accessible to a supplier. Indeed, 
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) show that the 
advent of CDS trading can increase the bankruptcy risk of the reference firm. Therefore, 
a supplier may perceive customer CDS as signaling higher revenue risk going forward. 
As such, the supplier has an incentive to maintain lower leverage, especially when it is 
dependent on its customers. However, there are also plausible scenarios under which 
firms can have higher leverage after CDS trading on their customers. For example, when 
there are no CDS on the supplier itself, customer CDS can be used as a proxy hedging 
tool by lenders to manage supplier credit risk. Because hedged lenders are more willing 
to increase the credit supply, supplier leverage may increase. Therefore, the effect of 
customer CDS trading on supplier leverage is ultimately an empirical question. 
Using linked data on both the supply chain relationship and CDS trading, we find 
that, all else equal, the leverage of suppliers is significantly lower if a larger proportion 
of the suppliers’ revenue is derived from CDS-referenced customers. The effect is also 
economically meaningful: a one-standard-deviation increase in sales to CDS-referenced 
customers is associated with a 0.5-0.8 percentage point lower market leverage ratio, 
while the average market leverage ratio is 15% for our sample suppliers, which are 
relatively small firms. 3  The customer CDS effect is above and beyond the critical 
customer effect documented by Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008), and it persists 
after controlling for customer characteristics such as credit quality and leverage. Our 
finding is also robust to variations in model specification, sample selection and variable 
measurement.  
In a first attempt to establish a causal relationship, we conduct a difference-in-
differences analysis by matching treated and control groups of suppliers that are from 
the same industry, that are of similar size, and that are linked to customers with similar 
credit quality. The treated and control suppliers differ by their customer CDS status. In 
this matched sample, the customer CDS-treated firms experience significantly greater 
leverage decreases than the control firms. Furthermore, we run placebo tests by 
                                                          
3 The CDS effect on suppliers is smaller than but at the same order of magnitude as the direct CDS effect 
on the leverage of referenced firms documented by Saretto and Tookes (2013).  
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randomizing the CDS introduction time on customers, and there are no significant 
results from the placebo samples. 
CDS trading on customers is arguably an exogenous event to the suppliers, which 
usually do not trade CDS.4 However, one potential selection issue hindering the causal 
interpretation of our findings is that suppliers may choose customers with or without 
CDS trading. The amount of sales derived from CDS customers therefore may be jointly 
determined with supplier leverage. To infer causality, we use the instrumental variable 
approach. We construct two instrumental variables for our key independent variable: 
the proportion of a supplier’s sales to customers with CDS trading. The first instrument, 
the foreign exchange (FX) hedging position of customer firms’ lenders and bond 
underwriters, follows Saretto and Tookes (2013). The use of FX hedging is related to 
lenders’ general hedging strategy, including CDS trading, but the aggregate FX hedging 
interests of a bank are unlikely to be related to the credit quality of a particular borrower 
of the bank and the borrower’s suppliers. The second instrument is based on lenders’ 
loan portfolio concentration. Lenders typically have thousands of loans in their portfolio, 
and the concentration with respect to industry or location is largely determined by their 
business model. Therefore, loan portfolio concentration is exogenous to the leverage of 
the borrowing firms’ suppliers. Moreover, lenders with more concentrated loan 
portfolios have stronger incentives to use CDS to diversify (Minton, Stulz, and 
Williamson, 2009). Both instruments seem valid, and our findings after the 
instrumentation remain significant.  
We show that the CDS externalities are channeled through trade-relationship-
specific exposure. Specifically, we find a stronger effect on supplier leverage when 
suppliers have more accounts receivable, when the customer-supplier relationship is 
long term, and when the products supplied to customers are more unique. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that the information improvement caused by customer CDS is likely to be a 
driving mechanism behind suppliers’ leverage decrease. 5 We find stronger effects for 
more opaque suppliers (with less analyst coverage), for which information improvement 
                                                          
4 Financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds, not the suppliers, decide whether 
to trade the CDS of a particular entity. CDS traders usually must be members of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) to be protected by ISDA CDS Master Agreements. 
5 Prior studies such as Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that CDS trading reveals insider information. 
Moreover, CDS trading can pressure firms to reveal more information. Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-
Moerman (2014) find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when firms have actively 
traded CDS. We provide a more detailed discussion in Section 2. 
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is likely to be more pronounced. We also show that suppliers that are more exposed to 
CDS-referenced customers primarily decrease their leverage by issuing equity rather 
than reducing debt, and their equity issuance costs are lower. In addition to the 
“information improvement” mechanism, customer distress signaled by CDS trading 
seems to be another force behind the leverage externalities. We find that the effect is 
stronger when CDS-referenced customers are closer to financial distress and that 
suppliers reduce their capital expenditures when their customers have CDS trading. 
While both the information improvement mechanism and the customer distress 
mechanism contribute to the leverage externalities, the information improvement 
mechanism is more consistent with suppliers using equity to decrease leverage. 
This paper improves our understanding of the implications of CDS trading. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that CDS trading affects non-
CDS industrial firms. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) find that firm credit risk 
increases after CDS trading. Our study extends their work, as the potential of CDS to 
increase customer credit risk engenders externalities to suppliers and hence suppliers’ 
incentive to decrease leverage as a precaution. More importantly, our findings support 
and highlight the informational role of CDS. Information production from CDS trading 
alleviates information asymmetry on the suppliers, thus inducing greater and more 
efficient equity usage. Our study is closely related to that of Saretto and Tookes (2013), 
who show that a firm’s leverage is higher after its own CDS trading. We find that the 
impact of CDS spills over to upstream non-CDS firms. In contrast to the positive effect 
on the referenced customers themselves, CDS have a negative effect on supplier leverage. 
Importantly, such externalities affect a much larger population of firms and have a 
considerable economic magnitude, indicating that the concerns over CDS are by no 
means confined to reference firms only. Overall, our findings support regulations of the 
CDS market that are aimed at enhancing the market’s transparency and efficiency. 
Customer CDS trading points to a new dimension of factors in firms’ capital 
structure decisions. Such external determinants of leverage are consistent with Titman’s 
(1984) stakeholder theory of capital structure as well as recent studies on “peer effects” 
by Leary and Roberts (2014). In our study, financial contracts written on customers can 
influence suppliers’ leverage decisions. This study also adds to the burgeoning literature 
on supply chain effects in corporate finance, such as Kale and Shahrur (2007) and 
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Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008). We show that corporate leverage is affected by 
both product market relationships and financial market innovations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the existing 
literature and develop predictions for the empirical tests in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the data and summary statistics. Our baseline empirical results are presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the underlying mechanisms for our main findings. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and empirical predictions 
Recent studies have examined various effects of CDS trading on corporate finance. 
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model the “empty creditor” problem and predict that firms 
are more likely to receive debt financing but will face tougher creditors after CDS 
trading. Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that firm leverage is higher if the firm’s debt is 
referenced by CDS. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) show that firm bankruptcy 
risk increases after CDS trading. To date, existing studies have largely focused on the 
impact of CDS trading on the reference firms themselves. Little attention has been paid 
to CDS trading externalities, that is, the spillover effects of one firm’s CDS trading on the 
economic or financial activities of other firms. 6 
The externalities of CDS are potentially more widespread than the direct effects 
of CDS because only a handful of firms are referenced by CDS contracts, and many of 
them are large financial firms. Meanwhile, a far greater number of firms are connected 
to CDS-referenced firms through real economic links. Externalities can arise if the 
connected firms’ information environment or economic interests are affected by CDS. 
One prominent linkage between firms is the supplier-customer relationship. This 
linkage is important because suppliers’ trade credit and future revenue directly depend 
on their customers’ activities. Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that accounts 
receivable are 18% of total assets on average for U.S. firms in their sample.  
                                                          
6 Several studies analyze the impact of CDS trading on stock and bond market quality and financial 
intermediaries of the referenced firms. Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) examine how CDS affect the 
efficiency, quality, and liquidity of bond markets. Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes (2013) analyze the impact 
of CDS trading on stock market liquidity and efficiency. Chava, Gunduri, and Ornthanala (2013) examine 
how CDS affect the relevance of credit ratings. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2014) document the 
standardization and liquidity role of CDS markets, which emerge as alternative trading venues. Augustin, 
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) provide an overview of the literature. 
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The customer-supplier setting is ideal for our study of CDS externalities because 
customer CDS trading is mostly exogenous to the suppliers. The CDS market consists of 
institutional investors and financial firms, so it is reasonable to assume that industrial 
suppliers do not trade their customers’ CDS.7 Why would CDS contracts on customers 
impact their suppliers’ leverage? In the following, we discuss a number of potential 
channels and mechanisms.  
 
2.1. Trade relationship 
Customers and suppliers are linked in the supply chain through trades. 
Intuitively, suppliers are more likely to adjust their corporate policies in response to 
customer CDS trading when their trade credit exposure to customers is greater, when 
the relationship is more of a long-term nature, and when they are more dependent on 
customers. 
Suppliers often get paid by their customers sometime after delivering goods and 
services. Trade credit can either assure the customer of product quality or assuage 
customers’ financing pressure. However, trade credit is unsecured. In the event of 
customer default, suppliers may recover only a portion of the outstanding accounts 
receivable. Therefore, when suppliers provide more trade credit and have more accounts 
receivable, they are more likely to actively adjust their corporate policies in response to 
customer financial conditions. We conjecture that firms extending more trade credit will 
experience more pronounced customer CDS trading effects on their leverage. 
Some trade relationships are temporary, while others are more enduring. When 
the relationship is long term, customer information is more pertinent for future cash 
flows, and suppliers are more likely to pay attention to changes in customer conditions. 
If a supplier frequently switches customers, information about a particular customer 
revealed by its CDS will be of little relevance. Therefore, customer CDS trading is more 
likely to impact supplier leverage when the trade relationship is long term. 
When the products that suppliers produce and sell to customers are more 
relationship-specific, the cost of switching customers is higher. Suppliers are then more 
                                                          
7 CDS traders usually abide by the ISDA Master Agreements. Members of ISDA are exclusively financial 
firms or funds. Our conclusion, however, does not depend on this presumption. Given their information 
advantage, suppliers could potentially benefit if they can trade the CDS of their customers, but we find a 
negative effect of exposure to CDS-referenced customers on a supplier’s financial aggressiveness. 
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dependent on the existing customers and thus more sensitive to customer conditions 
such as CDS trading. This situation is likely more applicable to suppliers that produce 
differentiated goods as opposed to standardized goods. Because their outputs are unique 
and customized, it is difficult for such suppliers to search and adapt themselves to new 
customers. Thus, we expect the effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage to be 
stronger among suppliers of differentiated goods.  
In sum, we argue that the supplier-customer relationship acts as the channel 
through which customer CDS exert influence on suppliers’ financial policies. We then 
ask whether this influence encourages or discourages suppliers to use leverage, i.e., the 
mechanisms that determine the direction of the leverage externalities.8 
 
2.2. Information improvement 
CDS trading and price discovery facilitate information production regarding the 
reference firm. Given the economic connection between a reference firm and its 
suppliers, such information can be important for the suppliers’ financial policies. First, 
information produced through customer CDS can be used to infer supplier performance 
and alleviate the supplier’s information asymmetry. In other words, CDS trading on 
customers improves the information environment for suppliers. CDS not only reveal 
information through price discovery in the market but also promote information 
production. For example, Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2014) find that 
managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts when firms have actively traded 
CDS. As the supplier’s information environment improves, equity becomes less costly 
and can be used more for external financing. Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) 
show that firms with better information quality issue more stock and have lower 
leverage.  
The information improvement mechanism also suggests that opaque firms will 
benefit more than transparent firms from a better information environment. Thus, 
customer CDS will have a larger negative impact on supplier leverage among opaque 
suppliers. Conceivably, firms with less analyst coverage are more opaque. For those 
firms, the customer CDS effect on supplier leverage should be more pronounced. 
                                                          
8 Although the difference might be subtle, we distinguish “channel” from “mechanism”. We use channel to 
describe why customer CDS matter for suppliers in the first place. We use mechanism to describe how 
customer CDS tend to impact supplier leverage in a particular direction, i.e., negatively or positively.  
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Thus, from the information improvement mechanism, we expect suppliers with a 
larger exposure to CDS-referenced customers to have lower leverage. Moreover, this 
CDS effect should be stronger for opaque suppliers. The information improvement 
mechanism also predicts that suppliers primarily decrease leverage by issuing equity. 
Furthermore, given the lower informational costs and ease for investment banks to 
place such securities, we expect that suppliers issue equity at more favorable terms, e.g., 
with smaller SEO discounts and lower underwriting fees. 
 
2.3. Customer distress 
CDS trading on customers may signal concerns regarding the customers’ credit 
risk, thus inducing suppliers to use more conservative financial policies. 9  The 
implications of CDS trading for financial distress are consistent with prior theoretical 
and empirical studies. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) argue that CDS could give rise to a 
higher incidence of costly bankruptcies due to tougher creditors. Subrahmanyam, Tang, 
and Wang (2014) show empirically that a firm’s default risk increases after CDS trading. 
Concerns about customers can be transmitted to the suppliers through the supply 
chain.10  
The suppliers of CDS-referenced customers may have an incentive to maintain 
lower leverage as a precaution for future revenue disruptions or a loss of trade credit. 
According to structural models of corporate finance and investment (see, e.g., Garlappi 
and Yan, 2011; Choi, 2013; Obreja, 2013), firms optimally choose lower financial 
leverage when facing higher asset risk or cash flow risk. Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) 
show that for firms with low levels of debt, which is the case for the average supplier 
firm in our sample, an increase in business risk induces lower leverage. Relatedly, 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) show that suppliers reserve debt 
capacity to support financially distressed customers. Moreover, the warning signal 
conveyed by CDS will be more imminent if the CDS-referenced customers are closer to 
                                                          
9 Alldredge and Cicero (2015) show that supplier firms’ top executives pay attention to customer firms’ 
performance and use such information for insider trading. 
10 Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) show that customer distress has a significant and negative 
impact on supplier performance. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that customer stock returns can predict 
supplier stock returns. Those studies also suggest that the information diffusion from customers to 
suppliers may take some time, allowing suppliers to take customer information into account and adjust 
accordingly. 
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financial distress. In such cases, the CDS externalities on supplier leverage will be 
stronger. 
The customer distress mechanism thus also predicts that suppliers with a larger 
exposure to CDS-referenced customers will have lower leverage.11 However, in contrast 
to the information improvement mechanism, the customer distress mechanism further 
predicts that the CDS effect is stronger when the customers are closer to financial 
distress. Moreover, if customer CDS are perceived as a red flag of default risk, suppliers 
will likely adopt a conservative investment policy to avoid overcapacity if customers fail 
and demand shrinks. We thus expect affected suppliers to cut capital expenditures as 
uncertainty increases. However, suppliers may maintain their R&D expenses in search 
of new growth opportunities.  
 
2.4. Pass-through effects from increased credit supply to customers 
Saretto and Tookes (2013) examine CDS-referenced firms and find that when 
lenders can hedge their exposure, they will extend more credit to borrowers. Customer 
CDS can also be used as a proxy hedge for supplier credit risk if the supplier’s credit risk 
is highly correlated with the customer’s credit risk. Such CDS as a proxy-hedging tool 
mechanism predicts that suppliers with a larger exposure to CDS-referenced customers 
have higher leverage. Accordingly, this effect is stronger when suppliers’ cash flow is 
highly correlated with their customers’ cash flow. The proxy-hedging role will be limited, 
however, if customer CDS spreads are imperfectly correlated with supplier credit risk. 
Moreover, Kapadia and Pu (2012) and Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2014) find evidence 
of market segmentation and irrationality in the CDS market. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of CDS as a proxy-hedging tool remains an empirical question. 
Banks may have constraints on the total credit provided to customers and 
suppliers. In this case, more customer credit may “crowd out” supplier credit.12 Given 
Saretto and Tookes’ (2013) finding that the credit supply to a firm increases when the 
                                                          
11 We also note that according to the stakeholder theory of capital structure (Titman, 1984), new customer 
information produced by CDS will induce a supplier to adjust its leverage so that its liquidation policy is 
optimally positioned. The direction of this leverage adjustment, however, is unclear. For example, if CDS 
signal heightened customer default risk, the supplier may be less interested in using low leverage as a 
commitment device to retain customers. However, if supplier commitment enhances customers’ survival 
probability, then the supplier may want to decrease its leverage. 
12 Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2014) show that government borrowing crowds out corporate borrowing.  
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firm has CDS, it is possible that supplier leverage can decrease. However, the recent rise 
of supply chain finance suggests that total credit may increase when lenders finance 
both customers and suppliers.13 Additionally, banks may prefer lending to the suppliers 
of its portfolio firms to lending to other new firms if the customer firms can provide 
references and information about the suppliers. A suitable setting to test the crowd-out 
effect is when a supplier and its CDS-referenced customers share the same lender, 
where the negative effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage will be particularly 
pronounced if the crowd-out effect is at work.  
When customers can obtain more credit directly after CDS trading, they will not 
need as much trade credit from suppliers, especially when trade credit is expensive. 
Therefore, suppliers’ need for short-term debt to fund receivables will decrease. This 
trade credit support mechanism predicts lower supplier leverage after customer CDS 
trading. However, whether suppliers fund receivables with debt or equity is unclear. As 
an indirect way to test this mechanism, we can examine whether customers use less 
trade credit after their own CDS introduction. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Sample construction 
We first compile a dataset of CDS trading sourced from two major CDS 
interdealer brokers: CreditTrade and GFI. The data are based on actual transaction 
information such as committed quotes and trades rather than non-tradable quotes. We 
identify the starting date of each firm’s CDS trading from these records.14 Similar data 
are used by Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014), among others. CreditTrade data 
cover the period from June 1997 to March 2006, and GFI data cover the period from 
January 2002 to April 2009. The overlapping period helps assure the data quality from 
each source. 15 We focus on North American, single-name corporate CDS (i.e., CDS 
referencing a corporation as opposed to a sovereign entity). We regard the underlying 
                                                          
13 We note that customers and suppliers can be complements rather than competitors for credit. Credit-
constrained suppliers are unlikely to satiate demands from credit-abundant customers. Therefore, cutting 
credit to suppliers may undo the effect of more credit to customers. 
14 CreditTrade merged with Creditex in 2007, and Creditex is now part of ICE (Intercontinental Exchange). 
CreditTrade was the biggest data source for CDS transactions during the earlier period of the CDS market. 
GFI Group is a major wholesale market brokerage in the derivatives markets, and it has also become a 
leading CDS data provider in recent years.  
15 We also validate the overall data quality by comparing Markit CDS quote data with ours. 
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firm as a CDS-referenced firm since the first transaction date. Because our data begin in 
1997, which is regarded by many market observers as the inception of the CDS market, 
there is minimal concern about the possible censoring of a firm’s CDS trading status.16  
We collect data on supplier-customer relationships from Compustat Segments 
files. The same dataset was constructed and used by Fee and Thomas (2004), Shahrur 
(2005), Kale and Shahrur (2007), Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008), Hertzel, Li, 
Officer, and Rodgers (2008), and Cohen and Frazzini (2008), among others. Regulation 
SFAS No. 131 requires firms to disclose in their interim financial reports the identity of 
and amount of sales to any customer accounting for more than 10% of total sales. Some 
firms also report customers that contribute less than 10% of sales but are considered 
important to their business.17 We need the identity of critical customers to link them 
with companies covered by Compustat Fundamentals Annual, but customer names are 
often reported using abbreviations. Therefore, for each customer firm, we carefully look 
through Compustat companies to find names that have key components in common 
with the customer firm and select the firm that we determine is a definite match. On 
some occasions, where a match is ambiguous or there are multiple potential matches, 
we further manually determine the match (or the lack of it) by researching related 
websites such as stock exchanges, official company websites, and Google Finance. We 
collect financial and industry information about each supplier firm directly from 
Compustat Fundamentals Annual. 
We link the CDS-referenced firms with those in the supplier-customer dataset. 
The above procedure produces a dataset with information about each firm covered by 
Compustat Segments files and its reported critical customers, as well as whether and 
when any of its critical customers (and the supplier firm itself) are referenced by CDS. 
We only include supplier firms that are incorporated in the U.S., have common stock 
covered by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and are not in the 
financial or utility industries. We exclude those suppliers that are themselves referenced 
by CDS from our main analysis. This restriction ensures that our empirical results are 
                                                          
16 Nevertheless, it is possible that some less actively traded CDS contracts are not captured by our dataset. 
Therefore, our estimated effect represents a lower bound of the actual effect because such a 
misclassification will bias the estimate toward zero. 
17 Prior to 1997, Regulation SFAS No. 14 governed segment disclosure. SFAS No. 131 was issued by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board in June 1997 and is effective for fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 1997.  
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not contaminated by the supplier’s own CDS status. Nevertheless, our results are robust 
to a sample including these CDS-referenced suppliers, as we discuss later. 
Table 1 provides a year-by-year summary of the number of supplier firms, the 
average number of critical customers per supplier firm, the number of customers that 
are referenced by CDS, and the number of supplier firms with CDS-referenced 
customers. A typical firm in our sample has two to three critical customers. The number 
of CDS-referenced customer firms exhibits an increasing trend over the sample years, 
while the number of suppliers that have CDS-referenced customers rises dramatically in 
the earlier half of the sample years and falls slightly in the latter half. We note that the 
number of suppliers linked to CDS-referenced customers is much greater than the 
number of CDS-referenced customers. For example, while the number of CDS-
referenced firms is 219 in 2002, the number of firms that may be subject to CDS 
externalities through links with their critical customers is 694. 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in our baseline 
analysis. We measure a firm’s financial leverage using both the market and book 
leverage ratios:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝑀𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑀 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑡+𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑡 𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙
𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑡𝑡 𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑡 𝑙𝑜 𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒+𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙−𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒−𝑑𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑑 𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙   (1) 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀 𝐿𝑀𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑀 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑡+𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑡 𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙
𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑙                                                                (2) 
The median market (book) leverage ratio is 7.0% (12.5%) for the supplier firms in our 
sample. Nearly 20% of the firms have a zero leverage ratio. As we discuss later, 
excluding such zero-leverage firms from the sample does not change our results. 
If a firm’s CDS status has an impact on its upstream firms’ capital structure, then 
suppliers that derive a larger proportion of revenue from CDS-referenced customers are 
more likely to be affected by such externalities. We therefore use a supplier’s sales to 
CDS-referenced critical customers divided by its total sales to measure the supplier’s 
exposure to CDS-referenced customers and label this figure % Sales to Customers with 
CDS: 
 
                  % 𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑀𝑆 𝑀𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆 𝑤𝑤𝑀ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝑆 = 𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑙 𝑡𝑙 𝐶𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝑆 𝑖𝑙 𝐶𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝑌𝑡𝑙𝑡
𝑇𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑙 𝑙𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡            (3) 
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This variable has a mean value of 0.06. We note that one-quarter of the suppliers have 
positive sales to CDS-referenced customers. Among these suppliers, the average % Sales 
to Customers with CDS is 0.26, and the maximum is 0.73. Thus, a sizable set of firms is 
subject to potential CDS externalities from their critical customers, and this exposure 
shows large cross-sectional variations. As we discuss later, our results are robust to 
alternative measures of exposure to CDS-referenced customers as well as the exclusion 
of suppliers that have no CDS-referenced customers throughout the sample years.  
We use a host of leverage determinants as control variables, following, among 
others, Frank and Goyal (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013), and Leary and Roberts 
(2014): the median leverage ratio of the firm’s three-digit SIC industry (Industry 
Median Leverage), market-to-book asset ratio (Market-to-Book), fixed assets as a 
proportion of total assets (Fixed Assets), operating income after depreciation 
(Profitability), firm size (Total Assets), standard deviation of operating income before 
depreciation (Earnings Volatility), other tax shield benefits (Loss Carry-Forward), 
unexpected earnings (Change of EPS), and whether the firm has a credit rating (Rated). 
We also use the firm’s stock return in the concurrent year (12-Month Stock Return) to 
control for the firm’s market conditions and the firm’s industry (three-digit SIC) median 
stock return to control for its industry conditions. The supplier firms in our sample are 
relatively small, and 11.6% of them are rated.  
We further control for a number of customer characteristics that could affect a 
supplier leverage decision. Because CDS-referenced firms are usually large firms, it is 
possible that our measure of a supplier’s exposure to CDS-referenced customers, % 
Sales to Customers with CDS, only captures the importance of large customers in a 
supplier’s total sales. Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) show that the importance of 
sales to critical customers has a significant effect on a firm’s leverage, which is 
consistent with the stakeholder theory of capital structure (Titman, 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Therefore, to differentiate the CDS effect from the importance of critical 
customers in a supplier’s total sales, we include in the regression % Sales to Critical 
Customers, which is computed as the sum of sales to all critical customers reported by 
the supplier divided by the supplier’s total sales. This variable has a mean (median) of 
0.39 (0.34), indicating that critical customers account for a large proportion of the 
sample suppliers’ revenue. 
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According to the bargaining theory (e.g., Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Chu, 
2012) and the relation-specific investment theory (e.g., Kale and Shahrur, 2007; 
Hennessy and Livdan, 2009), customers’ leverage choices may also affect a supplier’s 
capital structure. Because customer leverage also tends to be associated with customers’ 
CDS status, we further include Customer Leverage as a control, which is the average 
leverage ratio of a supplier’s critical customers weighted by the supplier’s sales to each 
customer. 18 Furthermore, we control for customers’ recent performance, Customer 
Average Return, which is the average stock return of the critical customers in the recent 
twelve months. We also include a vector of dummy variables to control for customers’ 
credit quality. Specifically, we first compute the average S&P credit rating (in numerical 
values such that AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) of each customer weighted by sales to the 
customer. Based on this average value, we then generate indicator variables for the 
rating categories: AA and above, A, BBB, BB and below, and unrated. 
The correlations between % Sales to Customers with CDS and other variables are 
generally low (see Internet Appendix Table A1), suggesting that a firm’s exposure to 
CDS-referenced customers is a dimension that has little overlap with the standard 
leverage determinants. 
 
4. Effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage 
This section presents our empirical findings on the relationship between supplier 
leverage and customer CDS trading. We first show our baseline results, followed by a 
host of robustness checks. Then, we address potential endogeneity issues and show that 
our results are consistent with a causal interpretation.  
 
4.1. Baseline results 
We use panel regressions to examine the impact of a supplier’s exposure to CDS-
referenced customers on its leverage. The fully specified baseline regression model is the 
following: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 × % 𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑀𝑆 𝑀𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆 𝑤/ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝟐 × 𝐶𝐵𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝑖 × 𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 × 𝐶𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡(4) 
                                                          
18 For suppliers whose customers have no CRSP-Compustat merged data, we replace the missing values 
with the annual sample median. As we discuss later, our results do not depend on this extrapolation and 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications and sample choices.  
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The dependent variable is the market or book leverage ratio of firm i in a given year t. 
The explanatory variables include our variable of interest, % Sales to Customers with 
CDS, and Controls, a set of leverage determinants and the potential confounders 
discussed above. Throughout our analysis, the explanatory variables are one-period-
lagged to the dependent variable, except for 12-Month Stock Return, the control for 
concurrent market conditions. 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑡 are vectors of firm and year dummy variables 
used to control for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. We report the t-statistics for 
our coefficient estimates using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
The estimation results, which are presented in Table 3, show that % Sales to 
Customers with CDS has a statistically significant impact on both the market and book 
leverage of a firm. In the market leverage regressions, the coefficient estimate is -6.65 (t-
statistic = -4.46) with firm fixed effects in column 1, and -3.84 (t-statistic = -2.66) with 
both firm and year fixed effects in column 2. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics in 
the book leverage regressions (columns 3 and 4) are of similar magnitude. The effect is 
also economically significant. With the firm and year fixed effects, a one-standard-
deviation increase in % Sales to Customers with CDS is associated with a 0.53% (0.82%) 
decrease in the market (book) leverage ratio. This magnitude is 7.6% (6.6%) of the 
median market (book) leverage ratio. To further put these numbers into context, in the 
same analysis, a one-standard-deviation increase in a firm’s profitability decreases the 
leverage ratios by 1.3-2.0%, and the decrease in leverage is approximately 3.7-4.0% if a 
rated firm loses its credit rating. Considering that a firm’s leverage is 2-5% higher after 
its own CDS trading, as reported by Saretto and Tookes (2013), the externalities of 
customer CDS on supplier leverage are fairly meaningful.  
The coefficients of the control variables in Table 3 are largely consistent with 
those documented in the literature. The coefficient of Customer Leverage is positive but 
insignificant with full set of controls. The weak effect of customer leverage on supplier 
leverage may reflect counteracting forces of the bargaining theory and the relation-
specific investment theory. The coefficient estimate for Customer Average Return is 
significantly negative. Importantly, the above findings suggest that critical customers’ 
CDS status has an impact on a supplier firm’s capital structure that is above and beyond 
the effects of standard leverage determinants, including customer characteristics.  
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What is the plausible magnitude of a change in a supplier’s leverage in response 
to a change in its exposure to CDS-referenced customers? We do not have a structural 
model to calculate equilibrium target leverage, but we can use the tradeoff between tax 
benefits and financial distress costs to make a simple illustration. Suppose we hold tax 
benefits as fixed. If customer CDS trading implies heightened financial distress costs for 
the supplier, the relevant question is the extent to which an increase in financial distress 
costs can be offset by a decrease in leverage. Using the simplified structural credit risk 
model as in the studies by Merton (1974) and Bharath and Shumway (2008), the 
probability of default (PD) is the normal transformation of distance-to-default (DD): 
PD=N(-DD). Distance-to-default is roughly the inverse of leverage divided by asset 
volatility. Holding volatility fixed, distance-to-default is proportional to the inverse of 
leverage. Assuming that the initial distance-to-default is 2 (roughly corresponding to a 
BB rating), if leverage decreases by 5% (e.g., from 0.070 to 0.066), then the distance-to-
default increases by approximately 5% to 2.1, and the probability of default drops from 
2.28% to 1.79%, a 21.5% change. The expected costs of default (or financial distress) are 
equal to the probability of default multiplied by the costs of default. Thus, a 21.5% 
decrease in the probability of default may offset a 17.7% increase in financial distress 
costs associated with customer CDS.19 If the initial distance-to-default is 1, then for 5% 
decrease in leverage, PD changes from 15.9% to 14.7%, a 7.4% change, offsetting a 6.9% 
increase in financial distress costs. 
The above back-of-the-envelope calculations demonstrate that the estimated 
leverage decrease seems reasonable to offset a sizable increment of financial distress 
costs due to a heightened exposure to CDS customers. If we take into account the loss of 
tax benefits when lowering leverage, then the financial distress costs due to customer 
CDS would have to be even larger to warrant the above-mentioned leverage decrease for 
the supplier firms.20 
 
 
                                                          
19 Because 1/(1+21.5%)=82.3%=1-17.7%. 
20 We can also consider other economic effects. Suppose that the negative effect of customer CDS on 
supplier leverage comes from suppliers issuing more equity due to an improved information environment 
after customer CDS trading. Given an average direct expenses ratio of 6.65% for seasoned equity offers 
(Corwin, 2003), a firm with median total assets ($123.8 million) and a median book leverage ratio (12.5%) 
should be able to save $0.7 million in information-related indirect costs if it decreases its leverage to 
11.5% through an equity issue of $10.8 million.  
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4.2. Robustness 
4.2.1. Alternative samples 
Our findings are robust to a number of sampling choices. First, including 
suppliers both with and without CDS in the sample and controlling for their differences 
produces qualitatively the same results (suppliers with CDS references are excluded in 
the baseline analysis to avoid potential contamination by their own CDS status). Second, 
we find similar results when we take the 2007-2008 crisis period out of our sample and 
begin the sample period in 1998 to ensure that SFAS No. 131 was fully effective. Third, 
zero-leverage firms are a unique group that has received special attention recently (e.g., 
Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). We find that the effect of customer CDS status on supplier 
leverage is even stronger for the subsample that excludes zero-leverage firms. Fourth, 
suppliers that never have CDS-referenced customers may be fundamentally different 
from those with CDS customers. We thus exclude suppliers that never had CDS-
referenced customers from the sample, and our findings remain the same. The above 
results are reported in the Internet Appendix Table A2. 
 
4.2.2. Additional customer characteristic controls 
As a further robustness check, we include additional controls for customer 
characteristics, such as market-to-book ratio, profitability, size, and stock return 
volatility. We compute the average of the characteristic measures across a supplier’s 
critical customers weighted by sales to each customer. Our results, which are reported in 
Internet Appendix Table A2, are virtually the same as the baseline.  
We use the sample median to replace missing customer characteristics data to 
maintain a large and consistent sample for our analysis. For robustness, we use three 
alternative means of addressing this missing data issue and find qualitatively the same 
customer CDS effect (results are reported in Internet Appendix Table A3). 
 
4.2.3. Alternative measure of the impact of customer CDS trading 
The measure of the influence of customer CDS in our baseline analysis captures 
the intensity of the customer-supplier connection via sales. To demonstrate suppliers’ 
reaction to customer CDS trading, we replace % Sales to Customers with CDS with Have 
Customer with CDS, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the supplier has CDS-referenced 
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customer(s). This measure is simpler but coarser. As shown in Panel A of Table 4, our 
results using this alternative measure are qualitatively the same as our baseline results. 
Our results are also robust to the other three alternative constructs of the key 
independent variable as shown in Internet Appendix Table A2: (1) sales to CDS-
referenced customers as a proportion of sales to all critical customers (% Sales to 
Critical Customers with CDS), (2) the proportion of critical customers that have CDS 
trading (% Customers with CDS), and (3) the average amount of customers’ CDS 
outstanding weighted by the supplier’s sales to each customer (Customers CDS 
Outstanding). These results, combined with our baseline analysis, show that customer 
CDS trading has both quantitative and qualitative effects on supplier leverage.  
 
4.2.4. Change analysis 
We conduct a change analysis to further understand the dynamic relationship 
between customer CDS trading and supplier leverage. We regress the first difference of 
the dependent variable on the first differences of the independent variables. The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 4. There is a negative and significant relationship 
between the change in % Sales to Customers with CDS and the change in Book 
Leverage. The effect on Market Leverage is negative but insignificant. Even if the 
specification only considers the effect associated with time-series changes, the economic 
magnitude is still approximately half of that in the level regressions. 
The results suggest that the observed CDS externalities are not simply a cross-
sectional phenomenon; time-series changes in a supplier’s exposure to CDS-referenced 
customers are associated with changes in the supplier’s leverage as well.  
 
4.3.  Addressing endogeneity 
Although our results survive a host of robustness checks, one additional concern 
is that a supplier’s leverage and its exposure to CDS-referenced customers are jointly 
determined. In this section, we address potential endogeneity with a difference-in-
differences analysis and an instrumental variable regression. 
 
 
 
19 
 
4.3.1. Difference-in-differences 
The change analysis in the previous subsection indicates that the CDS 
externalities work through time-series variations as well as cross-sectionally. In this 
section, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to further understand how 
suppliers experience CDS externalities as they begin to have CDS-referenced customers. 
Moreover, by matching treated suppliers with untreated suppliers, this analysis 
alleviates endogeneity concerns. 
The difference-in-differences analysis is based on a matched sample with a four-
year event window. Specifically, a treated supplier is defined as having CDS-referenced 
customer(s) in the third and fourth years (t and t+1) of a four-year window and having 
no CDS-referenced customer(s) in the first and second years (t-2 and t-1). A control 
supplier is defined as having no CDS-referenced customers throughout the four-year 
window. A control supplier is then matched with a treated supplier in year t-1 of the 
four-year window if they are in the same two-digit SIC industry and their size and 
customer default risk are the closest to each other among all potential matches. We use 
Total Assets to measure firm size and use the Customer Z-Score, which is defined as the 
average Z-score of the customers weighted by the supplier’s sales to each customer, to 
measure customer default risk. 
This matching procedure ensures that the treated and control suppliers resemble 
each other closely in terms of industry, size, and customer financial conditions ex ante 
but differ in whether they receive the treatment, i.e., begin having CDS-referenced 
customers. As such, the leverage change in the matched window for control firms can be 
considered to approximate what the leverage change would have been in the event 
window had the treated firm not received the treatment. The difference between the 
change in leverage for treated firms and that for control firms thus reveals the causal 
effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage.  
The comparison of the matched firms is reported in the Internet Appendix Table 
A3. The matched firms have almost the same size before treatment, but the treated firms 
tend to have customers with higher Z-scores than the control firms. Such matching 
would nevertheless work against finding a significant relationship between customer 
CDS and supplier leverage because treated firms are less likely to deleverage if they have 
safer customers on average.  
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We then implement the difference-in-differences analysis in a regression 
framework. We define two dummy variables. Treated equals one if the supplier received 
the treatment (started to have CDS-referenced customer(s)) in year t of the event 
window. This dummy variable distinguishes the treated and control suppliers. After 
equals one for year t and t+1 in the event window, and it equals zero for year t-2 and t-1. 
This variable distinguishes the years before and after the treatment for the treated 
supplier, and it distinguishes the years in the matched window for the control supplier.  
As shown in Column 1 and Column 4 of Table 5, compared with the control firms, 
the treated firms decreased their leverage significantly after they began having 
customers with CDS. The coefficient for Treated*After is -2.64 (-2.19) for the market 
(book) leverage specification, and both are statistically significant. That is, on average, a 
treated firm’s market (book) leverage decreases by 2.64 (2.19) percentage points after it 
begins having CDS-referenced customers. By contrast, the coefficient for After shows 
that a control firm’s market (book) leverage increases by 1.19 (1.11) percentage points 
(statistically insignificant in the book leverage specification) on average in the post-
treatment years. The evidence is clear that depending on their exposure to CDS-
referenced customers, similar suppliers take significantly different paths in their 
leverage dynamics.21 
 
4.3.2. Placebo tests 
There might be a concern that the leverage decrease after having CDS-referenced 
customers is the result of a predetermined trend rather than a demonstration of CDS 
externalities. If such a trend exists, then we should observe the comovement of supplier 
leverage and customer CDS trading regardless of the exact timing at which the firm 
changes leverage and having CDS-referenced customers. 
We use placebo tests to address this concern regarding expected future 
changes.22 If our results are driven by a predetermined trend, we should still observe a 
                                                          
21 We have also analyzed suppliers that have been serving a customer for at least two years before the 
customer becomes referenced by CDS (“long-term customer”). This sample is smaller, but CDS trading is 
arguably exogenous to the supplier’s choice of customers. We match this sample of treated suppliers with 
control suppliers that have long-term customers without CDS but are in the same industry and have a 
similar size and customer default risk. Table A5 in the Internet Appendix shows that customer CDS still 
have a negative effect on supplier leverage in this alternatively matched sample, although it is statistically 
significant only on market leverage. 
22 We thank the referee for suggesting the placebo tests. 
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similar effect if we incorrectly assign the treatment one or two years before the actual 
event. On the other hand, if the supplier’s leverage change is driven by customer CDS, 
then the effect will disappear if we incorrectly assign the treatment time. Columns 2 and 
3 (5 and 6) in Table 5 show the difference-in-differences results for market (book) 
leverage when we incorrectly assign the treatment one year and two years before the 
actual event, respectively. The coefficient for the interaction term Treated*After is no 
longer significant. Thus, the observed CDS externalities are unlikely to be driven by a 
predetermined trend. 
 
4.3.3. Instrumental variable regression 
Suppliers plan ahead and take proactive actions. They may anticipate or plan to 
have lower leverage in the future due to some unobserved factors.23 Based on this 
anticipation, suppliers might feel comfortable selling more to CDS-referenced customers 
at present. Another possibility is common negative productivity shocks that cause both 
suppliers and customers to become riskier, driving both the supplier to decrease 
leverage and CDS to start trading on the customer. Although the earlier placebo tests 
rule out a predetermined trend driving our results, we further address endogeneity 
concerns using instrument variable regression. 
We identify two instruments that are related to the customers’ CDS status but are 
arguably not directly driving the supplier’s leverage. The first instrument, FX 
Derivatives Use by Customers’ Lenders, measures the amount of foreign exchange (FX) 
derivatives used by the major banks of a supplier’s customers. Minton, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2009) report that banks that use interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, 
and commodity derivatives are more likely to be users of CDS. That is, banks that 
actively hedge using derivatives tend to do so in a variety of markets. Thus, if a firm’s 
major banks intensively use foreign exchange derivatives, they are also likely to use CDS 
to hedge credit risk as well. Moreover, the aggregate FX hedging interests of a bank are 
unlikely to be related to the credit quality of a particular borrower of the bank and its 
suppliers. Thus, we consider this instrumental variable to satisfy the exclusion condition 
as well. 
                                                          
23 This anticipation is not reverse causality (supplier leverage changes causing customer CDS trading). 
Reverse causality is unlikely because the critical customers are generally much larger than the suppliers, a 
given customer typically has multiple suppliers, and industrial firms rarely trade any CDS. 
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To construct this instrument, we first follow Saretto and Tookes (2013) and 
obtain the FX derivatives usage of each customer’s major banks, and we then aggregate 
this usage across all of the customers of a given supplier to obtain the supplier-level 
instrumental variable. Specifically, for each customer, we find the banks that served as 
its leading lenders or bond underwriters over the past five years using data from 
DealScan and the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). Then, we compute the 
average amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging (rather than trading) 
purposes relative to the total assets of the bank holding companies of these 
lenders/underwriters of a given customer. Data on the usage of foreign exchange 
derivatives by banks are collected from the Call Reports from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Finally, we sum up the usage of foreign exchange 
derivatives by each customer’s lenders/underwriters across all of the customers of a 
given supplier.24  
The second instrument, % Sales to Customers with Concentrated Lenders, is 
computed as the supplier’s sales to customers with concentrated lenders divided by the 
supplier's total sales. A customer is considered to have concentrated lenders if the 
average Herfindahl index of its lenders in terms of each lender’s loan portfolio industry-
state concentration is above the annual sample median.25 Loan portfolio diversification 
is a major determinant of a bank’s risk level and is therefore closely related to the bank’s 
other risk policies, such as using derivatives on borrowers’ credit risk. However, the loan 
portfolio’s degree of diversification should have no direct bearing on the capital 
structure of a particular borrower’s supplier. Therefore, % Sales to Customers with 
Concentrated Lenders should also qualify as a valid instrument. We use loan data from 
DealScan to compute lenders’ loan portfolio concentrations. We match customer firms 
with their lenders in DealScan using the Compustat-DealScan link file provided by 
Michael Roberts as used by Chava and Roberts (2008).  
We then run 2SLS regressions with % Sales to Customers with CDS instrumented 
by the above two IVs, and the results are shown in Table 6. We find that a supplier’s 
                                                          
24 For suppliers whose customers cannot be matched to DealScan or FISD for lender or underwriter data, 
we replace the missing values with the sample median. Our results are similar if we exclude those 
observations. 
25 We follow Massa and Zhang (2013) and compute the Herfindahl index of a lender’s loans in different 
two-digit SIC industry and state pairs. Then, for a given customer firm, we compute the average 
Herfindahl index of all of its current lenders.  
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revenue from CDS-referenced customers still has a statistically significant impact on its 
capital structure, and the economic significance is even larger than that without 
instrumentation reported in Table 3. In the Internet Appendix Table A6, which reports 
the first-stage regression, we note that both instruments are significantly related to % 
Sales to Customers with CDS, and the F-test for instrumentation relevance rejects the 
notion that the instruments are weak. Because the IV regression ensures that only 
exogenous changes in a supplier’s revenue exposure to CDS-referenced customers are 
used for identification, these results corroborate the notion that customers’ CDS status 
indeed causes decreases in upstream firms’ leverage.  
 
5. Channels and mechanisms 
In this section, we examine the channels and mechanisms through which 
customer CDS trading lowers supplier leverage. We provide evidence that the impact is 
channeled through the suppliers’ trade-relationship-specific exposure to customers. We 
also find that suppliers issue more equity and at lower costs after customer CDS trading, 
which supports the conjecture of information improvement through customer CDS. In 
addition, suppliers reduce their leverage more when their customers are closer to 
financial distress, and they decrease investment after customer CDS trading. 
 
5.1. The trade relationship channel 
The trading of credit derivatives on customers matters for suppliers because 
suppliers often have important economic interests in their customers through their 
trade relationship. To verify that the CDS externalities are channeled through the 
supplier-customer relationship, we examine how suppliers’ trade-relationship-specific 
exposure interacts with customer CDS to affect the suppliers’ leverage.  
We use a number of measures to gauge the supplier-customer trade relationship. 
First, we compute a supplier’s accounts receivable associated with its critical customers 
as the supplier’s total accounts receivable multiplied by the ratio of sales to critical 
customers divided by total sales.26 Customer information should be of greater concern 
to a supplier if the supplier has extended a large amount of trade credit to its customers. 
                                                          
26 The best measure of relationship-specific exposure that we can think of is the accounts receivable to 
each individual customer. However, such customer-specific data are not available because only total 
accounts receivable are reported.  
24 
 
We interact % Sales to Customers with CDS with two indicators, High Receivables and 
Low Receivables, which are based on whether the trade credit to critical customers 
scaled by the supplier’s total assets is above or below the annual sample median 
(effectively, the impact of the CDS variable is allowed to vary  depending on whether the 
receivables are high or low). As shown in Panel A of Table 7, customer CDS have a much 
stronger impact when the supplier has a large trade credit exposure to critical customers. 
Second, we compute the average number of years of the relationship between the 
supplier and its current critical customers. The length of the trade relationship is an 
important aspect of relationship-specific exposure. The supplier should be more 
concerned about customers with whom their trade relationship tends to be long term. 
Based on whether the relationship length is greater than or equal to (less than) three 
years, we generate two indicators, Long Relationship and Short Relationship, 
respectively, and we interact them with our key variable, % Sales to Customers with 
CDS. Panel B of Table 7 shows that customer CDS have a greater and more significant 
effect on supplier leverage when their trade relationship is of a long-term nature than 
when the supplier switches customers frequently. 
Third, we measure relationship-specific exposure using suppliers’ output 
specificity. Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2009) argue that differentiated goods and 
services are more customer-specific than standardized goods. Suppliers producing the 
former thus tend to have greater relationship-specific exposure to their customers. We 
use the same classifications as Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2009) to generate two 
indicators according to whether a supplier’s output is (a) differentiated goods or services 
or (b) standardized goods. We interact % Sales to Customers with CDS with these 
indicators and find that suppliers that produce differentiated goods or services are much 
more sensitive to customer CDS than suppliers that produce standardized goods, as 
shown in Panel C of Table 7.  
In sum, the CDS externalities are stronger when the suppliers extend more trade 
credit, when the supplier-customer relationship is longer and when the relationship is 
more exclusive. Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that the CDS 
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externalities are channeled through suppliers’ trade-relationship-specific exposure to 
customers.27 
 
5.2. The information improvement mechanism 
One reason for lower supplier leverage after customer CDS trading could be that 
the information conveyed by customer CDS enhances the information environment of 
the supplier. Alleviated information asymmetry helps to lower a supplier’s cost of equity, 
making equity more desirable than debt as the marginal source of financing. We 
examine this information improvement mechanism from various angles. 
 
5.2.1.  Analyst coverage 
Firms face different information environments. Some firms are widely covered by 
multiple information intermediaries, while other firms do not have any analyst following 
at all. The additional information produced by customer CDS trading should matter 
most for relatively more opaque suppliers if the information improvement mechanism is 
at work. Therefore, we expect suppliers with less analyst coverage to experience more 
pronounced leverage decreases when their exposure to customers with CDS is higher. 
We test this proposition by dividing the sample of suppliers based on whether 
their analyst following is above or below the annual sample median and rerunning the 
baseline regressions on these subsamples. Panel A of Table 8 reports the estimation 
results. To the extent that analyst coverage is an important indicator of information 
asymmetry, suppliers that are scarcely followed by analysts suffer more from 
information asymmetry. Thus, information concerning their revenue sources produced 
by customer CDS should be particularly helpful to improve these suppliers’ information 
environment. This is exactly what we find: CDS externalities on supplier leverage are 
stronger among suppliers with low analyst following. For suppliers with ample analyst 
coverage, customer CDS trading has little or no effect on their leverage.28 
 
                                                          
27 Our results are robust to a number of alternative measures of trade-relationship-specific exposure, e.g., 
a supplier’s total accounts receivable scaled by total assets, a supplier’s reliance on critical customers, and 
the concentration of a supplier’s trade relationships (results are reported in Internet Appendix Table A7).  
28 A firm’s idiosyncratic volatility may also reflect information asymmetry. We find that the negative 
impact of customer CDS on supplier leverage is concentrated among suppliers with high idiosyncratic 
volatility (Internet Appendix Table A8 provides the results). 
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5.2.2.  Source of leverage reduction 
To obtain more direct evidence on the information improvement mechanism, we 
further examine a supplier’s financing behavior in response to heightened exposure to 
CDS-referenced customers. Specifically, we ask, how does a supplier affected by 
customer CDS trading decrease leverage, via retiring debt or issuing equity?  
Determining the source of leverage reduction will be useful to understand the 
underlying mechanisms. Evidence of suppliers’ issuing equity to decrease leverage 
would be consistent with the information improvement mechanism (while evidence of 
suppliers’ retiring debt to decrease leverage is more consistent with the customer 
distress mechanism, which is discussed in the next subsection). Specifically, if exposure 
to customer CDS implies an improved information environment for a supplier, then the 
supplier’s cost of equity should decrease more than its cost of debt does because debt is 
less information-sensitive. If exposure to customer CDS implies potential distress on the 
supplier, then debt retirement should be a more cost-efficient way to decrease leverage 
than equity issuance because both equity investors and underwriters will require greater 
risk compensation in the face of distress.  
We define Debt Retirement as debt reduction divided by the prior year's total 
assets, i.e., dltr(t)/at(t-1). Equity Issuance equals the sale of equity divided by the prior 
year's total assets, i.e., sstk(t)/at(t-1). We then run linear regressions of the above 
variables on the first difference of % Sales to Customers with CDS and a set of control 
variables (also in first difference). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show that Debt 
Retirement increases with % Sales to Customers with CDS, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. However, Columns 3 and 4 show that when % Sales to 
Customers with CDS increases, Equity Issuance is significantly higher, both statistically 
and economically. This result suggests that deleveraging is mainly achieved through 
equity issuance, which is consistent with the information improvement mechanism. 
 
5.2.3.  Equity issuance costs29  
To provide further evidence of the information improvement mechanism, we also 
examine the effect of customer CDS on a supplier’s equity issuance costs. As discussed 
above, the information improvement mechanism implies that a supplier’s equity 
                                                          
29 We thank the referee for suggesting this analysis. 
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issuance costs should be lower if the supplier has greater exposure to customers with 
CDS, while the costs should be higher under the customer distress mechanism. 
Therefore, the results regarding equity issuance terms are useful for distinguishing 
those two mechanisms. 
First, we examine how a supplier’s exposure to customers with CDS affects the 
underpricing of its seasoned equity offers (SEOs). If customer CDS help alleviate a 
supplier’s information asymmetry, new equity can be sold at a better price. However, if 
customer CDS are associated with financial distress concerns, new equity investors will 
demand a greater price discount. We regress SEO underpricing, which is defined as the 
closing price the day before the offer day divided by the offer price, following Altinkilic 
and Hansen (2003), Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) and Chan and Chan (2014), on % 
Sales to Customers with CDS and a set of control variables using a tobit regression.30 
Offering price and the other issuance term data are derived from Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum. Considering our particular setting, we also control for customer credit rating. 
The results, shown in column 1, Panel A of Table 10, indicate that suppliers with a larger 
sales exposure to CDS-referenced customers tend to experience lower SEO underpricing.  
In column 2, we further control for firm size, analyst coverage, and sales to 
critical customers, as these variables may be correlated with a supplier’s information 
asymmetry and therefore affect SEO underpricing as well. The results on the CDS 
variable are virtually unchanged. We include the customers’ average leverage, the 
supplier’s industry median stock return in the last 12 months, and the customer’s 
average stock return in the last 12 months as additional controls in column 3, and the 
effect of % Sales to Customers with CDS is still significant. For a change in % Sales to 
Customers with CDS from 0 to 50%, the SEO discount decreases by 1.56 percentage 
points. The finding that new equity investors demand a smaller discount for suppliers 
with greater exposure to CDS-referenced customers is consistent with CDS alleviating 
the informational costs associated with an equity offering.  
Second, we examine the gross spread of SEOs, which is the total investment 
banking fees paid to underwriters as a percentage of the SEO proceeds. Underwriters 
charge lucrative fees to price and market securities for issuers. The fees should be lower 
when the pricing and marketing are easier, such as for issuers with better information. 
                                                          
30 The results using OLS instead of the tobit model are virtually the same.  
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However, when issuers have concerns about financial distress, they are likely willing to 
pay higher fees to issue new equity, and underwriters also tend to charge higher fees for 
reputation concerns. As a baseline model, we regress SEO gross spread on % Sales to 
Customers with CDS and a set of control variables, following Butler, Grullon, and 
Weston (2005) and Lee and Masulis (2009), as well as the customer rating dummies. 
Panel B of Table 10 shows that % Sales to Customers with CDS has a negative and 
marginally significant effect on underwriting fees (column 1), and more evidently so 
when we include controls for supplier information asymmetry, industry conditions, and 
customer characteristics in columns 2 and 3. In column 3, when % Sales to Customers 
with CDS increases from 0 to 50%, the spread charged by underwriters is approximately 
0.22 percentage points lower on average. Given that a large proportion of underwriting 
fees is designed to compensate investment bankers for information production, this 
evidence is consistent with customer CDS improving the information environment 
related to suppliers. 
In sum, we find that the decrease in leverage in response to customer CDS is 
most pronounced among opaque suppliers. Importantly, the decrease in leverage is 
largely achieved by equity issuance, and the issuance costs are lower when the supplier’s 
sales exposure to CDS-referenced customers is greater. The combined evidence supports 
an improved information environment as a primary reason for supplier leverage 
reductions after customer CDS trading. 
 
5.3. The customer distress mechanism 
While customer CDS can alleviate a supplier’s information asymmetry and appeal 
to external equity investors, a supplier’s managers may nevertheless perceive customer 
CDS as requiring caution (e.g., due to their better information access or different risk 
attitude than equity investors). Thus, by taking advantage of the lower informational 
costs to issue equity, managers are also able to alleviate potential distress going forward. 
In this subsection, we discuss whether customer distress plays a distinct role in the CDS 
externalities on supplier leverage. 
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5.3.1.  Customer credit risk 
Our first test for the customer distress mechanism is to examine the difference in 
the leverage response between suppliers whose customers are more susceptible to 
distress and those whose customers are relatively safe. For the former, the trading of 
their customers’ CDS is more likely to be associated with heightened risk going forward. 
Additionally, the potential effect of CDS to distort debtholders’ incentives and aggravate 
distress should be stronger among these customer firms. Thus, if the customer distress 
mechanism is at work, we expect the leverage of these suppliers to have a higher 
sensitivity to their customers’ CDS trading. We note that the information improvement 
mechanism is muted in this setting because a decrease in uncertainty per se should 
affect both groups of suppliers similarly. 
In Table 11, we divide the suppliers into two groups based on the average Z-score 
of their customers and rerun the baseline regressions on the subsamples. The results 
show that the negative effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage is more pronounced 
among suppliers whose customers’ average Z-scores are below the sample median. For 
suppliers with high credit quality customers, the effect is statistically insignificant. This 
evidence suggests that suppliers react more strongly to customer CDS trading when 
their customers are closer to financial distress.31  
 
5.3.2.  Supplier investment policy 
If a leverage decrease is a precaution due to a risky outlook signaled by customer 
CDS, it is likely that suppliers will also decrease their investment as a risk management 
measure. However, the relation between information environment and investment is 
less clear. 32 We thus examine the impact of exposure to customers with CDS on a 
supplier’s capital expenditures and R&D investment in columns 1-2 and 3-4 of Table 12, 
respectively. We find that % Sales to Customers with CDS has a negative and significant 
                                                          
31 Internet Appendix Table A9 shows that the negative effect of customer CDS on supplier leverage is 
concentrated among suppliers whose customers’ average credit rating is below investment grade. We also 
find that the CDS externalities are stronger for financially constrained suppliers and suppliers with fewer 
growth opportunities (results are in Internet Appendix Table A10 and A11).  
32 Theoretically, the impact of uncertainty on investment can be ambiguous (see, e.g., Caballero, 1991; 
Boyle and Guthrie, 2003). Empirically, Derrien and Kecskes (2013) examine analyst coverage and find a 
positive relationship between information quality and investment, but Asker, Farre-Mensa, and 
Ljungqvist (2015) find that publicly listed firms, which have arguably better information environments, 
invest less than otherwise comparable private firms.  
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effect on a supplier’s capital expenditures. The coefficient estimate shown in column 2 
suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in % Sales to Customers with CDS 
results in a 7.2% (3.8%) decrease from the median (mean) capital expenditures of the 
suppliers. We find no significant impact on suppliers’ R&D expenses. Because there is no 
evidence that the average supplier faces a credit crunch (Table 9), the investment 
decrease is likely a precautionary move. The maintenance of R&D expenses is also 
consistent with suppliers’ search for growth opportunities in case current customers 
fail.33 
Taking our evidence together, it seems that both the information improvement 
mechanism and the customer distress mechanism contribute to the leverage 
externalities. While we believe that the information improvement mechanism better 
explains the use of cheaper equity, the leverage reduction nevertheless also reflects 
managers’ caution due to potential distress.  
 
5.4. Discussion of other mechanisms 
We consider other possible mechanisms that may lead to a negative relationship 
between exposure to CDS-referenced customers and supplier leverage (also see Section 
2). For example, in addition to the quantity or amount of leverage, maturity is another 
important dimension of credit. As detailed in the Internet Appendix Table A13, we find 
that debt maturity is somewhat shorter when a supplier’s exposure to CDS-referenced 
customers is larger. This effect is statistically significant with firm fixed effects but 
insignificant once year fixed effects are included. Therefore, a supplier’s debt maturity 
does not increase (to counteract the decrease in the quantity of debt) after customer 
CDS trading. 
One potential mechanism discussed in Section 2 is customer credit crowding out 
supplier credit. The evidence on suppliers’ external financing behavior shown in Table 9 
reveals that debt reduction is insignificant after customers’ CDS trading, which is 
inconsistent with a credit crowding-out story. We also perform an analysis on a 
subsample where both the supplier and its customers can be linked to DealScan. There 
is no evidence that the CDS externalities on supplier leverage are more pronounced 
                                                          
33 We have also examined how exposure to CDS-referenced customers affects a supplier’s operating 
performance, such as sales growth and profitability. As reported in the Internet Appendix Table A12, we 
find no significant impact of customer CDS on suppliers’ sales growth and profitability. 
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when a supplier shares the same lead banks with its CDS-referenced customers (see the 
Internet Appendix Table A14 for details). Hence, we do not find evidence of the crowd-
out mechanism. Another possible mechanism works through trade credit support. 
Because customers with CDS can obtain more credit on their own, suppliers may not 
need to provide as much trade credit when more of their sales are to customers with 
CDS. If some of the trade credit is financed by a supplier’s debt, then the supplier will be 
able to reduce its debt level. Our finding in Table 9 that suppliers do not experience 
significant reductions in debt levels is not supportive of this mechanism.34  
 
6. Conclusion 
Although only a small proportion of firms are directly linked to credit default 
swaps (CDS), we show that CDS affect many firms through their economic links with the 
referenced firms. When a firm generates a larger proportion of revenue from CDS-
referenced customers, it tends to use less financial leverage. This result is robust to 
controlling for the importance of critical customers, industry shocks, and customer 
credit quality. It also persists in a difference-in-differences analysis. Moreover, after 
addressing potential endogeneity using instrumental variables, our result remains 
statistically and economically significant.  
We further show that, through the channel of their trade relationship, 
information produced by customer CDS is likely the main driver of the observed 
externalities on supplier leverage. Customer CDS help to improve the information 
environment of the supplier, making equity more attractive than debt as the marginal 
source of financing. Additionally, customer CDS signal potential distress of the customer 
going forward, inducing the supplier to decrease leverage as a precaution.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to show that CDS referencing 
one firm can generate externalities on the financial policies of another related firm 
without CDS. Our findings can be useful for policymakers and regulators. CDS are a 
major concern for regulators all over the world. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
U.S. aims to improve the disclosure, settlement, clearing, and risk management of CDS 
                                                          
34 We have also examined whether a customer’s accounts payable, i.e., the trade credit provided by 
suppliers, decreases after its CDS begin trading. We find that customers with CDS actually tend to have 
larger amounts of accounts payable, although this effect is not statistically significant. Thus, trade credit 
support does not seem to be a significant mechanism for the CDS externalities. 
32 
 
trading. The E.U. has partially banned buying CDS without holding reference bonds. On 
the other hand, China and India recently took initiatives to set up onshore CDS trading. 
An important implication of our research is that the informational role of CDS on other 
related firms should be taken into consideration for objective and balanced policy 
debates. Finally, this paper highlights the interaction between financial innovations and 
product market relations in shaping corporate financial policies, which broadens our 
view of the external determinants of firms’ capital structure. 
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Table 1: Sample Firms Over Time 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. CDS trading data are from GFI Group, 
CreditTrade, and Markit. 
Fiscal Year Total Number of Supplier Firms 
Average Number of 
Customers per 
Supplier Firm 
Number of Customer 
Firms w/ Active CDS 
Number of Supplier 
Firms Having CDS-
Referenced 
Customers 
1997 3,256 2.01 11 84 
1998 2,960 2.03 27 253 
1999 2,113 2.31 66 362 
2000 2,557 2.32 115 505 
2001 2,334 2.39 175 598 
2002 2,236 2.44 219 694 
2003 2,044 2.45 230 683 
2004 2,072 2.48 235 640 
2005 2,035 2.49 243 625 
2006 2,032 2.54 237 619 
2007 2,021 2.65 245 638 
2008 1,735 2.65 230 507 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. Market Leverage is the sum of long-term debt 
and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of the market value of assets, i.e., (dltt+dlc)/(prcc_f*csho+at-ceq-
txdb)*100. Book Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of total assets, 
i.e., (dltt+dlc)/at*100. % Sales to Customers w/ CDS is sales to customers that have CDS trading as a proportion of 
the supplier's total sales. Industry Median Market (Book) Leverage is the median market (book) leverage of the 
supplier's industry classified by the three-digit SIC code. Market-to-Book is the ratio of market assets to book assets, 
i.e., (prcc_f*csho+at-ceq-txdb)/at. Fixed Assets is fixed assets as a proportion of total assets, i.e., ppent/at. 
Profitability is EBIT scaled by total assets, i.e., oiadp/at. Total Assets is the natural log of total assets, i.e., ln(at). 
Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of EBIT in the last five years scaled by total assets, i.e., std(oiadp)/at. 
Loss Carry-Forward is the total loss carry-forward scaled by total assets, i.e., tlcf/at. Change of EPS is the change in 
earnings per share from last year scaled by stock price, i.e., [epspx(t)-epspx(t-1)]/prcc_f(t). Rated equals 1 if the 
supplier has an S&P long-term issuer credit rating and 0 otherwise. 12-Month Stock Return is the cumulative stock 
return of the supplier in the last 12 months. Industry Median Return is the annual median stock return of the 
supplier's 3-digit SIC industry. % Sales to Critical Customers is sales to all critical customers as a fraction of the 
supplier's total sales. Customer Market (Book) Leverage is the average of each customer's market (book) leverage 
weighted by sales to the customer. Customer Average Return is the average of each customer's cumulative stock 
return in the past 12 months weighted by sales to the customer. The last two variables are set equal to their annual 
sample median when none of the supplier's customers has CRSP-Compustat merged data. Customer rating dummies 
are constructed as follows. First, we compute the average S&P credit rating of each customer weighted by sales to 
the customer, where letter grades are converted into numerical values (AAA=1, AA+=2, …). Then, based on this 
average value, a vector of indicators representing the following categories is generated: AA and above, A, BBB, BB 
and below, and unrated. 
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Variable # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
Market Leverage 26508 0.146 0.179 0.000 0.070 0.714 
Book Leverage 27312 0.198 0.224 0.000 0.125 1.019 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS 26846 0.055 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.728 
Industry Median Market Leverage 27394 0.109 0.105 0.000 0.084 0.741 
Industry Median Book Leverage 27394 0.147 0.117 0.000 0.138 1.563 
Market-to-Book 26585 2.273 2.195 0.525 1.527 14.032 
Fixed Assets 27062 0.233 0.224 0.005 0.151 0.900 
Profitability 27383 -0.045 0.282 -1.385 0.043 0.343 
Total Assets 27392 4.871 1.715 1.268 4.819 9.846 
Earnings Volatility 23045 0.102 0.145 0.005 0.053 0.914 
Loss Carry-Forward 17322 0.621 1.546 0.000 0.037 9.684 
Change of EPS 25242 -0.030 0.502 -2.720 0.003 2.117 
Rated 27395 0.116 0.321 0.000 0.000 1.000 
12-Month Stock Return 26953 1.105 0.821 0.083 0.948 5.169 
Industry Median Return 27390 0.976 0.294 0.306 0.973 1.795 
% Sales to Critical Customers  26503 0.389 0.270 0.010 0.340 1.000 
Customer Market Leverage 27395 0.128 0.077 0.000 0.106 0.511 
Customer Book Leverage 27395 0.225 0.086 0.000 0.227 0.580 
Customer Average Return 27395 1.097 0.795 0.088 0.951 5.054 
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Table 3: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: Baseline Results 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors 
are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -6.649*** -3.836***  -8.732*** -5.933*** 
  (-4.459) (-2.659)  (-3.988) (-2.704) 
Industry Median Leverage  25.31*** 17.90***  18.45*** 13.06*** 
  (8.939) (6.555)  (5.642) (3.970) 
Market-to-Book  -0.668*** -0.793***  -0.414*** -0.541*** 
  (-7.048) (-8.287)  (-2.584) (-3.379) 
Fixed Assets  11.87*** 8.722***  11.73*** 9.579*** 
  (5.105) (3.765)  (3.941) (3.216) 
Profitability  -4.039*** -4.595***  -6.114*** -7.095*** 
  (-3.747) (-4.124)  (-3.371) (-3.869) 
Total Assets  2.004*** 3.740***  2.153*** 4.000*** 
  (4.858) (8.040)  (4.020) (6.635) 
Earnings Volatility  -0.516 0.840  4.342 5.705 
  (-0.235) (0.382)  (1.127) (1.470) 
Loss Carry-Forward  0.589*** 1.117***  0.834** 1.372*** 
  (2.667) (4.752)  (2.089) (3.325) 
Change of EPS  -0.176 -0.183  0.0757 0.0998 
  (-0.582) (-0.598)  (0.164) (0.211) 
Rated  4.064*** 4.024***  3.740*** 3.705*** 
  (4.229) (4.358)  (2.736) (2.770) 
12-Month Stock Return  -3.820*** -3.454***  -1.717*** -1.556*** 
  (-22.25) (-20.55)  (-9.162) (-7.901) 
Industry Median Return  -0.901** 0.315  -0.773* 0.415 
  (-2.572) (0.654)  (-1.690) (0.676) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -2.222** -1.370  -1.685 -0.660 
  (-2.186) (-1.360)  (-1.210) (-0.475) 
Customer Leverage  5.071** 0.147  5.038** 1.648 
  
(2.280) (0.0646)  (2.045) (0.620) 
Customer Average Return  -1.103*** -1.059***  -0.670*** -0.581*** 
  (-7.411) (-7.208)  (-3.293) (-2.854) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  9,937 9,937  10,043 10,043 
R-sqr Within   0.181 0.213   0.062 0.078 
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Table 4: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Alternative Measure of Customer CDS Exposure and Change Analysis 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. In Panel A, the dependent variable is Market 
Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). Have Customer w/ CDS equals 1 if the 
supplier has at least one CDS-referenced customer and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is change 
from t to t+1 of Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and change from t to t+1 of Book Leverage in columns (3) 
and (4). The independent variables are changes from t-1 to t. The other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Alternative Measure 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Have Customer w/ CDS  -2.568*** -1.461***  -3.314*** -2.160*** 
  (-4.506) (-2.591)  (-4.728) (-3.048) 
Industry Median Leverage  25.81*** 17.94***  18.24*** 12.58*** 
  (8.870) (6.348)  (5.657) (3.862) 
Market-to-Book  -0.663*** -0.782***  -0.409** -0.527*** 
  (-7.054) (-8.286)  (-2.561) (-3.331) 
Fixed Assets  11.73*** 8.510***  11.76*** 9.541*** 
  (5.163) (3.769)  (4.013) (3.257) 
Profitability  -4.159*** -4.664***  -6.166*** -7.094*** 
  (-3.837) (-4.163)  (-3.409) (-3.875) 
Total Assets  2.035*** 3.777***  2.135*** 3.982*** 
  (5.037) (8.187)  (4.075) (6.696) 
Earnings Volatility  -0.400 0.928  4.167 5.476 
  (-0.182) (0.423)  (1.088) (1.421) 
Loss Carry-Forward  0.612*** 1.133***  0.851** 1.380*** 
  (2.813) (4.887)  (2.171) (3.416) 
Change of EPS  -0.247 -0.253  -0.0359 -0.0109 
  (-0.776) (-0.787)  (-0.0748) (-0.0222) 
Rated  4.113*** 4.100***  3.800*** 3.788*** 
  (4.359) (4.490)  (2.835) (2.871) 
12-Month Stock Return  -3.809*** -3.447***  -1.701*** -1.547*** 
  (-22.41) (-20.72)  (-9.178) (-7.948) 
Industry Median Return  -0.813** 0.440  -0.690 0.549 
  (-2.329) (0.923)  (-1.524) (0.899) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -2.767*** -1.665*  -2.412* -1.183 
  (-2.781) (-1.701)  (-1.800) (-0.886) 
Customer Leverage  4.392** -0.663  4.380* 0.714 
  
(1.999) (-0.294)  (1.805) (0.273) 
Customer Average Return  -1.140*** -1.103***  -0.706*** -0.627*** 
  (-7.668) (-7.569)  (-3.454) (-3.075) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  10,089 10,089  10,197 10,197 
R-sqr Within   0.181 0.215   0.062 0.078 
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Panel B: Change Analysis 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
First Difference   (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -1.412 -1.292  -3.469** -3.372** 
  (-1.282) (-1.190)  (-2.041) (-1.987) 
Industry Median Leverage  4.489** 0.257  -0.936 -1.803 
  (2.307) (0.131)  (-0.372) (-0.702) 
Market-to-Book  -0.433*** -0.451***  -0.328** -0.352** 
  (-5.496) (-5.727)  (-2.139) (-2.291) 
Fixed Assets  4.551 3.332  2.418 2.245 
  (1.501) (1.107)  (0.736) (0.678) 
Profitability  -1.072 -0.637  0.302 0.345 
  (-1.122) (-0.677)  (0.196) (0.222) 
Total Assets  0.278 0.176  0.0724 -0.124 
  (0.618) (0.393)  (0.124) (-0.209) 
Earnings Volatility  0.524 0.741  2.971 3.175 
  (0.220) (0.318)  (0.939) (0.998) 
Loss Carry-Forward  0.216 0.235  -0.219 -0.244 
  (0.869) (0.947)  (-0.558) (-0.617) 
Change of EPS  -0.0177 -0.0823  -0.0979 -0.103 
  (-0.0629) (-0.297)  (-0.284) (-0.298) 
Rated  1.140 1.146  -0.178 -0.167 
  (1.509) (1.569)  (-0.211) (-0.199) 
12-Month Stock Return  -3.524*** -3.347***  -1.294*** -1.312*** 
  (-21.76) (-20.76)  (-8.359) (-8.082) 
Industry Median Return  -0.398 0.304  -0.387 0.135 
  (-1.480) (0.838)  (-1.052) (0.285) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -0.311 -0.322  -0.697 -0.625 
  (-0.366) (-0.379)  (-0.665) (-0.592) 
Customer Leverage  4.455** 1.079  4.297* 4.916* 
  
(2.486) (0.593)  (1.762) (1.906) 
Customer Average Return  -1.228*** -1.179***  -0.742*** -0.732*** 
  (-9.020) (-8.697)  (-4.138) (-4.036) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No No  No No 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  6,824 6,824  6,895 6,895 
R-sqr   0.141 0.166   0.019 0.022 
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Table 5: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Difference-in-Differences Analysis and Placebo Tests 
The original sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated 
in the U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not 
themselves referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. From the original sample, we 
construct a matched sample of treated and control suppliers as follows: (1) A treated supplier is defined as having 
CDS-referenced customer(s) in the third and fourth years (t and t+1) of a four-year window and having no CDS-
referenced customer(s) in the first and second years (t-2 and t-1). (2) A control supplier is defined as having no 
CDS-referenced customers throughout a four-year window. (3) A control supplier is matched with a treated supplier 
in year t-1 of the four-year window if they are in the same two-digit SIC industry and their Total Assets and 
Customer Z-Score are the closest to each other among all potential matches. Customer Z-Score is the average Z-
score of each customer weighted by sales to the customer. The placebo treatment is defined as having CDS-
referenced customers one year (or two years) before the actual year of treatment. The dependent variable is Market 
Leverage in columns (1)-(3) and Book Leverage in columns (4)-(6). The treatment year is the actual event year in 
columns (1) and (4), is one year before the actual event year in columns (2) and (5), and is two years before the 
actual event year in columns (3) and (6). Treated equals 1 if the supplier has CDS-referenced customer(s) during the 
sample period and 0 otherwise. After equals 1 if the year is after the year when the control supplier is matched with 
the treated supplier (one year before the treatment) and 0 otherwise. The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  Actual t t-1 t-2  Actual t t-1 t-2 
   (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Treated*After  -2.638** -0.833 -0.349  -2.187* -0.849 -2.240 
  (-2.458) (-0.598) (-0.178)  (-1.691) (-0.573) (-0.933) 
Treated  0.686 0.876 0.570  0.527 1.321 2.347 
  (0.748) (0.632) (0.327)  (0.467) (0.787) (0.923) 
After  1.193* 1.148 0.220  1.107 2.155* 2.737 
  (1.759) (1.229) (0.153)  (1.382) (1.804) (1.365) 
Industry Median Leverage  1.598 -11.01 -25.16*  1.004 -19.26* -16.16 
  (0.254) (-1.019) (-1.935)  (0.133) (-1.706) (-1.097) 
Market-to-Book  -0.137 -0.929*** -0.583*  -0.258 -1.545*** -0.903 
  (-0.630) (-3.735) (-1.952)  (-0.809) (-3.366) (-1.580) 
Fixed Assets  20.07*** 30.39** 34.82***  15.85* 24.44* 26.51* 
  (3.114) (2.558) (3.252)  (1.932) (1.958) (1.706) 
Profitability  -3.274 -10.36*** -11.87***  -2.179 -11.98*** -15.17*** 
  (-1.403) (-2.652) (-2.650)  (-0.606) (-2.663) (-2.791) 
Total Assets  3.285*** 6.576** 4.882  3.742** 5.457 7.079 
  (2.830) (2.243) (1.609)  (2.220) (1.266) (1.479) 
Earnings Volatility  1.399 13.73* 16.75*  5.057 13.61* 19.67 
  (0.307) (1.899) (1.791)  (0.894) (1.761) (1.473) 
Loss Carry-Forward  -0.0602 -0.587 -1.938**  0.446 -1.318 -2.417* 
  (-0.116) (-0.647) (-2.040)  (0.483) (-1.040) (-1.687) 
Change of EPS  -0.854 -1.569** 0.168  -2.671** -1.640** -0.668 
  (-1.087) (-2.176) (0.184)  (-2.341) (-2.131) (-0.638) 
Rated  0.179 -8.734*** -8.408**  1.084 -1.855 -2.731 
  (0.113) (-3.341) (-1.987)  (0.448) (-0.641) (-0.623) 
12-Month Stock Return  -1.904*** -2.678*** -2.760***  -0.926** -1.974** -2.002** 
  (-5.353) (-7.400) (-4.589)  (-2.517) (-2.442) (-2.201) 
Industry Median Return  -1.114 -0.334 -3.487  -1.728 -2.283 -1.919 
  (-1.162) (-0.155) (-1.550)  (-1.419) (-1.071) (-0.726) % Sales to Critical 
Customers   -0.551 2.040 -7.242  3.292 9.000 0.237 
  (-0.250) (0.338) (-1.242)  (0.688) (1.139) (0.0317) 
Customer Leverage  4.969 4.847 2.182  0.327 -9.429* -5.916 
  
(0.896) (1.158) (0.381)  (0.0873) (-1.688) (-0.980) 
Customer Average Return  -0.272 -0.156 -0.178  0.327 0.747 -0.0661 
  (-0.804) (-0.303) (-0.412)  (0.920) (1.112) (-0.113) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs.  1,758 496 390  1,770 497 391 
R-sqr Within   0.216 0.395 0.360   0.083 0.324 0.327 
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Table 6: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Instrumental Variable Regression 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The variable of interest, % Sales to Customers with 
CDS, is instrumented by FX Derivatives Use by Customers’ Lenders and % Sales to Customers with Concentrated 
Lenders. FX Derivatives Use by Customers’ Lenders is constructed as follows. For each customer firm, we compute 
the average amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to the total assets of the bank 
holding companies of the banks serving as the customer firm’s lead lenders or bond underwriters in the past five 
years. Then, we sum this value across all of the customer firms of a given supplier. % Sales to Customers with 
Concentrated Lenders is defined as sales to customers with concentrated lenders as a proportion of the supplier's 
total sales. A customer is considered to have concentrated lenders if the average Herfindahl index of its lenders' loan 
portfolio industry-state concentration is above its annual sample median. The other variables are defined in Table 2. 
Standard errors are robust, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -21.37*** -9.959*  -24.78*** -16.91*** 
  (-4.224) (-1.898)  (-4.004) (-2.582) 
Industry Median Leverage  24.74*** 17.88***  17.50*** 12.99*** 
  (11.28) (8.056)  (6.077) (4.353) 
Market-to-Book  -0.704*** -0.800***  -0.452*** -0.552*** 
  (-7.952) (-9.295)  (-2.985) (-3.629) 
Fixed Assets  11.43*** 8.706***  11.23*** 9.505*** 
  (5.531) (4.291)  (4.324) (3.684) 
Profitability  -3.842*** -4.434***  -5.909*** -6.819*** 
  (-3.923) (-4.508)  (-3.665) (-4.148) 
Total Assets  2.388*** 3.754***  2.571*** 4.026*** 
  (6.424) (9.581)  (5.522) (8.033) 
Earnings Volatility  0.0195 0.943  4.921 5.873* 
  (0.0106) (0.527)  (1.604) (1.916) 
Loss Carry-Forward  0.645*** 1.100***  0.897*** 1.345*** 
  (3.541) (5.807)  (2.757) (3.991) 
Change of EPS  -0.258 -0.218  -0.0134 0.0389 
  (-0.763) (-0.647)  (-0.0264) (0.0750) 
Rated  3.832*** 3.937***  3.502*** 3.554*** 
  (4.269) (4.496)  (2.848) (2.923) 
12-Month Stock Return  -3.763*** -3.448***  -1.651*** -1.544*** 
  (-23.88) (-22.22)  (-8.800) (-7.974) 
Industry Median Return  -0.792** 0.321  -0.675 0.419 
  (-2.206) (0.670)  (-1.459) (0.688) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -0.534 -0.756  0.140 0.430 
  (-0.543) (-0.792)  (0.110) (0.339) 
Customer Leverage  6.348*** 0.711  5.960*** 2.600 
  
(3.085) (0.339)  (2.601) (1.073) 
Customer Average Return  -1.036*** -1.040***  -0.596*** -0.549*** 
  (-6.680) (-6.855)  (-2.873) (-2.657) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  9,137 9,137  9,235 9,235 
R-sqr Within   0.162 0.210   0.047 0.071 
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Table 7: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Trade-Relationship-Specific Exposure 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
column (1) and Book Leverage in column (2). Low (High) Receivables is an indicator that equals 1 if accounts 
receivable scaled by total assets (rectr/at) multiplied by the ratio of sales to critical customers to total sales is below 
or equal to (above) the annual sample median. Long (Short) Relationship is an indicator that equals 1 if the average 
number of years the supplier has been servicing each customer during the sample period weighted by the current 
sales to the customer is greater than or equal to (less than) three years. Differentiated Goods or Services 
(Standardized Goods) is an indicator that is equal to one if the supplier's industry produces differentiated goods or 
services (standardized goods). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  Market Leverage Book Leverage 
  (1) (2) 
Panel A: Trade Credit   
Sales to Customers w/ CDS * High Receivables -4.711*** -8.064*** 
 
(-2.792) (-3.169) 
Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Low Receivables -1.656 -0.620 
 
(-0.860) (-0.220) 
# Obs. 9,773 9,877 
R-sqr Within 0.212 0.078 
Panel B: Relationship Length   
Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Long Relationship -5.353*** -8.457*** 
 
(-3.040) (-3.170) 
Sales to Customers w/ CDS *Short Relationship -1.673 -2.335 
 
(-1.075) (-0.791) 
# Obs. 9,937 10,043 
R-sqr Within 0.214 0.079 
Panel C: Product Specificity   
Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Differentiated Goods or Services -4.488*** -5.516*** 
 
(-2.686) (-2.733) 
Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Standardized Goods -0.919 -1.424 
 
(-0.360) (-0.320) 
# Obs. 7,977 8,068 
R-sqr Within 0.219 0.086 
 
  
Other Controls  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: Information Improvement 
The original sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated 
in the U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not 
themselves referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The column labeled Large Coverage 
(Small Coverage) reports regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose analyst following is above (below) 
the annual sample median. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in 
columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  Large Coverage Small Coverage  Large Coverage Small Coverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -2.903 -3.932*  -3.295 -7.785** 
  (-1.476) (-1.772)  (-1.054) (-2.341) 
       
Other Controls   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  4,320 5,617  4,382 5,661 
R-sqr Within   0.234 0.207   0.087 0.081 
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Table 9: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Debt Retirement and Equity Issuance 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variables are Debt Retirement and 
Equity Issuance from year t to t+1 in columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively. Debt Retirement is debt reduction 
divided by last year's total assets, i.e., dltr(t)/at(t-1). Equity Issuance is the sale of equity divided by last year's total 
assets, i.e., sstk(t)/at(t-1). Industry Median Debt Retirement is the annual median Debt Retirement of the supplier’s 
three-digit SIC industry. Industry Median Equity Issuance is the annual median Equity Issuance of the supplier’s 
three-digit SIC industry. The independent variables are the changes from year t-1 to t. They are defined in Table 2. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Debt Retirement   Equity Issuance 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Sales to Customers w/ CDS  2.714 2.790  7.121** 6.791** 
  (0.966) (1.021)  (2.168) (2.079) 
Industry Median Debt Retirement  8.021 7.939    
  (1.269) (1.254)    
Industry Median Equity Issuance     8.181 7.555 
     (1.272) (1.158) 
Market-to-Book  0.433*** 0.451***  1.722*** 1.668*** 
  (3.298) (3.344) (3.751)  (3.615)  
Fixed Assets  3.226 3.334  5.481 5.723 
  (1.024) (1.052)  (1.052) (1.106) 
Profitability  -2.424* -2.239  3.138 3.093 
  (-1.734) (-1.588)  (0.865) (0.853) 
Total Assets  1.194 1.171  7.807*** 7.627*** 
  (1.154) (1.115)  (5.625) (5.538) 
Earnings Volatility  2.628 3.130  11.84 10.94 
  (0.755) (0.881)  (1.469) (1.348) 
Loss Carry-Forward  -0.0376 -0.0566  5.933*** 5.947*** 
  (-0.103) (-0.152)  (5.878) (5.883) 
Change of EPS  0.131 0.152  -0.501 -0.500 
  (0.336) (0.391)  (-0.822) (-0.822) 
Rated  0.890 0.927  -2.320** -2.337** 
  (0.570) (0.594)  (-2.176) (-2.179) 
12-Month Stock Return  0.688*** 0.751***  1.934*** 1.857*** 
  (2.748) (2.807)  (4.526) (4.139) 
Sales to Critical Customers  0.248 0.261  -0.692 -0.505 
  (0.257) (0.268)  (-0.364) (-0.266) 
Industry Median Return  -0.276 -0.363  0.900 0.486 
  (-0.630) (-0.574)  (1.494) (0.687) 
Customer Leverage  2.126 1.758  -3.051 -3.239 
  
(0.726) (0.587)  (-0.638) (-0.635) 
Customer Average Return  0.432** 0.448**  0.709* 0.651 
  (2.124) (2.148)  (1.730) (1.542) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  No No  No No 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  6,770 6,770  6,835 6,835 
R-sqr Within   0.003 0.004   0.058 0.061 
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Table 10: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
SEO Discount and Gross Spread 
The sample comprises seasoned equity offerings in the SDC Platinum database that are conducted by firms in the 
Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the U.S., have common stock covered 
by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves referenced by CDS. The sample 
period is between 1997 and 2008. In Panel A, the dependent variable is SEO Discount, which is defined as the 
closing price the day before the offer day divided by the offer price. Analyst Covered is an indicator that equals 1 if 
the issuer has analyst coverage. Issue Amount is the gross proceeds amount from the SEO. Relative Amount is the 
number of shares issued divided by the number of shares outstanding before the offer day. Stock Price Inverse is one 
divided by the closing price five days before the offer day. Excess Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the 
issuer's return in excess of the CRSP equally weighted market return for the 200 days ending one month before the 
offer day. Nasdaq is an indicator that equals 1 if the issuer is listed on the Nasdaq. Lead Manager Reputation is the 
annual market share of the lead manager in terms of issue amount. Price Adaptation is the offer price divided by the 
closing price the day after the filing day. Market Return is the cumulative CRSP equally weighted market return 
during the registration period. Abnormal Return is the cumulative issuer's return in excess of the CRSP equally 
weighted market return during the registration period. We use a tobit regression. In Panel B, the dependent variable 
is Gross Spread, which is defined as the gross spread as a percentage of the issue amount. Turnover is the total 
monthly volume over the six months prior to the offering divided by the number of shares outstanding, where 
Nasdaq trading volume is divided by two to correct for double counting. Firm Size is the average market value of 
equity in the six months prior to the offer day. Share Price is the average share price in the six months prior to the 
offer day. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the six months prior to the offer day. 
Multiple Bookrunners is an indicator that equals 1 if the issue is managed by more than one bookrunner. Amex is an 
indicator for whether the issuer is listed on the Amex. We use an OLS regression. The other variables are defined in 
Table 2. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Panel A. Supplier SEO Discount 
    (1) (2) (3) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -0.0292** -0.0292** -0.0312** 
  (-2.047) (-1.988) (-2.116) 
Total Assets   -0.00470** -0.00510** 
   (-2.325) (-2.498) 
Analyst Covered   -0.00647 -0.00586 
   (-1.247) (-1.122) 
% Sales to Critical Customers    0.00454 0.00477 
   (0.618) (0.648) 
Customer Leverage    0.0344 
    (1.514) 
Industry Return    0.00360 
    (0.464) 
Customer Average Return    -0.00173 
    (-0.631) 
Issue Amount  -0.0262** -0.0094 -0.0077 
  (-2.217) (-0.698) (-0.569) 
Relative Amount  0.0731*** 0.0586*** 0.0570*** 
  (4.549) (3.452) (3.360) 
Stock Price Inverse  0.0927*** 0.0901*** 0.0898*** 
  (4.992) (4.839) (4.809) 
Excess Return Volatility  0.851*** 0.758*** 0.761*** 
  (6.266) (5.438) (5.456) Nasdaq  0.00599 0.00175 0.00184 
 
 (1.317) (0.346) (0.361) Lead Manager Reputation  0.114* 0.173** 0.167** 
  
(1.664) (2.439) (2.364) 
Price Adaptation  -0.0757*** -0.0747*** -0.0752*** 
 
 (-9.633) (-9.506) (-9.571) Market Return  0.0751*** 0.0772*** 0.0776*** 
  
(6.874) (6.963) (6.990) 
Abnormal Return  0.0861*** 0.0838*** 0.0840*** 
  (8.016) (7.801) (7.831) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs.  1,308 1,281 1,281 
Model Chi-Sqr   336.3 344.66 350.12 
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Panel B. Supplier SEO Gross Spread 
    (1) (2) (3) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS 
 
-0.368* -0.453** -0.436** 
  
(-1.758) (-2.085) (-1.998) 
% Sales to Critical Customers  
  
0.192* 0.194* 
   
(1.791) (1.810) 
Analyst Covered 
  
-0.0929 -0.0891 
   
(-1.211) (-1.156) 
Customer Leverage 
   
-0.461 
    
(-1.367) 
Industry Return 
   
0.141 
    
(1.225) 
Customer Average Return 
   
-0.0416 
    
(-1.012) 
Turnover 
 
-0.115*** -0.109** -0.109** 
  
(-2.794) (-2.557) (-2.572) 
Issue Amount 
 
-0.00412 -0.00196 0.00111 
  
(-0.112) (-0.0520) (0.0293) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.725*** -0.722*** -0.722*** 
  
(-17.52) (-16.88) (-16.83) 
Share Price 
 
0.0912* 0.0879 0.0880 
  
(1.699) (1.615) (1.596) 
Return Volatility 
 
0.448*** 0.398*** 0.394*** 
  
(4.136) (3.577) (3.536) 
Lead Manager Reputation 
 
1.571 1.386 1.453 
  
(1.492) (1.292) (1.349) 
Multiple Bookrunners 
 
0.615*** 0.626*** 0.625*** 
  
(8.568) (8.549) (8.504) 
Nasdaq 
 
0.184** 0.189** 0.205** 
  
(2.403) (2.402) (2.575) 
Amex 
 
0.260 0.244 0.265 
  
(1.561) (1.434) (1.550) 
     Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
1,302 1,273 1,273 
R-squared   0.474 0.479 0.480 
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Table 11: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: Customer Distress 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The column labeled High Z (Low Z) reports 
regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose average customer Z-score is above or equal to (below) the 
annual sample median. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in 
columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  Low Z High Z  Low Z High Z 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -6.533* 1.315  -11.37** 3.263 
  (-1.826) (0.570)  (-2.119) (0.791) 
       
Other Controls   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  1,548 1,698  1,570 1,713 
R-sqr Within   0.295 0.285   0.190 0.143 
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Table 12: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Investment  
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Capital Expenditures 
and R&D Expenses in columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively. Capital Expenditures is capital expenditures divided 
by lagged total assets, i.e., capx(t)/at(t-1). R&D Expenses is research and development expenses (missing values 
replaced by 0) divided by lagged total assets, i.e., xrd(t)/at(t-1). Industry Median Capx is the annual median Capital 
Expenditures of the supplier’s three-digit SIC industry. Industry Median R&D is the annual median R&D Expenses 
of the supplier’s three-digit SIC industry. The other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Capx   R&D 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -2.315*** -1.828***  0.562 0.0440 
  (-3.872) (-3.046)  (0.773) (0.0604) 
Industry Median Capx  25.22*** 20.12***      (6.196) (4.487)    Industry Median R&D     5.026 2.778 
     (1.209) (0.671) 
Market-to-Book  0.650*** 0.596***  0.711*** 0.680*** 
  (9.793) (9.036)  (7.737) (7.359) 
Fixed Assets  -3.345** -3.053**  2.897*** 4.147*** 
  (-2.486) (-2.236)  (2.708) (3.847) 
Profitability  2.633*** 2.371***  -6.768*** -6.534*** 
  (4.674) (4.126)  (-8.364) (-8.030) 
Total Assets  -1.767*** -1.645***  -2.584*** -3.109*** 
  (-8.445) (-7.807)  (-12.81) (-13.90) 
Earnings Volatility  -1.447 -0.710  1.778 1.578 
  (-1.348) (-0.655)  (1.309) (1.137) 
12-Month Stock Return  0.489*** 0.558***  0.229*** 0.286*** 
  (6.549) (7.018)  (3.047) (3.595) 
Industry Median Return  0.648*** 0.988***  0.152 0.214 
  (3.568) (3.810)  (0.931) (1.120) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   0.250 0.355  1.625*** 1.421*** 
  (0.591) (0.841)  (3.550) (3.076) 
Customer Leverage  -2.595*** -1.848**  -3.118*** -0.880 
  
(-3.130) (-2.088)  (-3.659) (-0.992) 
Customer Average Return  0.294*** 0.383***  -0.123 -0.0526 
  (3.552) (4.533)  (-1.607) (-0.682) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  15,958 15,958  16,063 16,063 
R-sqr Within   0.096 0.104   0.174 0.187 
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Internet Appendix (to be posted online) for “The Leverage Externalities of Credit Default Swaps” 
Table A1: Correlations 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the 
financial or utility industries, and are not themselves referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
    1 Market Leverage 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
2 % Sales to Customers w/ CDS -0.038              
 
3 Industry Median Market Leverage 0.443 -0.061             
 
4 Market-to-Book -0.318 0.016 -0.214            
 
5 Fixed Assets 0.365 -0.077 0.415 -0.156           
 
6 Profitability 0.047 0.008 0.162 -0.193 0.100          
 
7 Total Assets 0.193 0.042 0.189 -0.160 0.205 0.403         
 
8 Earnings Volatility -0.140 0.022 -0.171 0.269 -0.143 -0.602 -0.426        
 
9 Loss Carry-Forward -0.113 0.014 -0.195 0.320 -0.139 -0.726 -0.405 0.640       
 
10 Change of EPS -0.117 0.011 -0.057 0.071 -0.033 0.069 -0.021 0.062 0.108      
 
11 Rated 0.305 0.008 0.192 -0.096 0.172 0.128 0.466 -0.136 -0.122 -0.030     
 
12 12-Month Stock Return -0.188 0.007 -0.080 0.352 -0.026 0.188 0.012 -0.056 -0.068 0.142 -0.009    
 
13 Industry Median Return -0.080 0.006 -0.059 0.108 0.049 0.111 0.025 -0.041 -0.055 0.086 0.023 0.434   
 
14 % Sales to Critical Customers  -0.081 0.334 -0.081 0.121 0.018 -0.177 -0.172 0.152 0.169 0.015 -0.101 -0.003 -0.013  
 
15 Customer Leverage 0.096 0.174 0.136 -0.079 0.075 0.026 0.032 -0.014 -0.042 -0.025 0.031 -0.057 -0.105 0.064  
16 Customer Average Return -0.188 0.007 -0.080 0.352 -0.026 0.189 0.013 -0.057 -0.069 0.142 -0.008 1.000 0.436 -0.004 -0.057 
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Table A2: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: Robustness Checks 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS (unless specified otherwise). The sample period is between 1997 and 2008 (unless specified 
otherwise). Under the panel “Alternative Sample”, we apply different restrictions to the original sample as specified. 
Under the panel “Alternative Variable of Interest”, we use % Sales to Critical Customers w/ CDS, % Customers w/ 
CDS, and Customer CDS Outstanding to measure the suppliers’ exposure to CDS-referenced customers. % Sales to 
Critical Customers w/ CDS is sales to customers that have CDS trading as a proportion of the supplier's sales to all 
identified critical customers. % Customers w/ CDS is the number of critical customers with CDS as a proportion of 
the supplier's total number of critical customers. Customer CDS Outstanding is the average amount of each 
customer's CDS outstanding in the most recent year weighted by sales to the customer. Under the panel “Alternative 
Specification”, we include the following additional controls for customer characteristics. Customer Market-to-Book 
is the average of each customer's market-to-book ratio weighted by sales to the customer. Customer Profitability is 
the average of each customer's profitability weighted by sales to the customer. Customer Size is the average of each 
customer's total assets weighted by sales to the customer. Customer Return Volatility is the average of each 
customer's stock return volatility weighted by sales to the customer. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation 
of monthly returns in the past 60 months. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and 
Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Alternative Sample:       
Include Suppliers w/ CDS  -6.019*** -3.282**  -7.811*** -5.127** 
  (-4.233) (-2.397)  (-3.720) (-2.450) 
       
Exclude 2007-2008  -5.916*** -3.047**  -7.890*** -5.405** 
  (-3.715) (-1.989)  (-3.310) (-2.287) 
       
Exclude Zero-Leverage Firms  -6.722*** -3.678**  -9.156*** -6.126** 
  (-4.170) (-2.366)  (-3.853) (-2.569) 
       
Exclude Firms w/ No CDS Customers  -5.975*** -2.636*  -7.996*** -4.295* 
  (-3.875) (-1.730)  (-3.578) (-1.884) 
       
Alternative Specification:       
Additional Customer Characteristic Controls  -5.270*** -3.584**  -7.190*** -5.458** 
  (-3.503) (-2.453)  (-3.257) (-2.484) 
       
Alternative Variable of Interest:       
% Sales to Critical Customers w/ CDS  -2.614*** -1.184*  -3.286*** -1.745* 
  (-3.830) (-1.745)  (-3.602) (-1.872) 
       
% Customers w/ CDS  -3.106*** -1.470**  -3.391*** -1.633 
  (-4.247) (-2.071)  (-3.402) (-1.621) 
       
Customer CDS Outstanding  -0.678*** -0.271*  -0.767*** -0.453* 
  (-4.087) (-1.649)  (-3.307) (-1.943) 
       
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   No Yes   No Yes 
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Table A3: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Robustness to Extrapolation 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
columns (1)-(3) and Book Leverage in columns (4)-(6). In columns (1) and (4), Extrapolation Indicator equals 1 if 
none of the supplier's customers has CRSP-Compustat merged data. In columns (2) and (5), suppliers without CDS-
referenced customers throughout are excluded. In columns (3) and (6), customers’ average variables are extrapolated 
as equal to their annual median among suppliers without CDS-referenced customers. The other variables are defined 
in Table 2 Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -3.997*** -3.682** -4.383***  -6.205*** -5.789*** -4.997** 
  (-2.764) (-2.538) (-2.774)  (-2.819) (-2.640) (-2.238) 
Industry Median Leverage  17.88*** 19.55*** 18.14***  12.96*** 14.30*** 12.67*** 
  (6.550) (6.015) (6.307)  (3.944) (3.861) (3.852) 
Market-to-Book  -0.793*** -0.778*** -0.787***  -0.540*** -0.572*** -0.544*** 
  (-8.282) (-6.909) (-8.025)  (-3.373) (-3.024) (-3.379) 
Fixed Assets  8.789*** 11.77*** 8.614***  9.682*** 13.68*** 8.938*** 
  (3.800) (4.532) (3.612)  (3.254) (3.988) (2.999) 
Profitability  -4.620*** -5.330*** -4.617***  -7.135*** -7.975*** -7.146*** 
  (-4.146) (-4.375) (-4.026)  (-3.895) (-4.064) (-3.823) 
Total Assets  3.744*** 3.748*** 3.629***  4.007*** 4.260*** 4.040*** 
  (8.055) (6.914) (7.627)  (6.656) (5.993) (6.639) 
Earnings Volatility  0.848 1.052 -0.0106  5.722 7.306 5.974 
  (0.385) (0.393) (-0.00471)  (1.473) (1.584) (1.525) 
Loss Carry-Forward  1.116*** 0.945*** 1.142***  1.373*** 1.206** 1.384*** 
  (4.752) (3.538) (4.775)  (3.330) (2.569) (3.312) 
Change of EPS  -0.178 -0.208 -0.136  0.108 0.0952 0.159 
  (-0.583) (-0.591) (-0.431)  (0.228) (0.189) (0.328) 
Rated  4.031*** 3.541*** 4.006***  3.715*** 3.709** 3.634*** 
  (4.371) (3.176) (4.109)  (2.780) (2.189) (2.673) 
12-Month Stock Return  -3.460*** -3.380*** -3.412***  -1.565*** -1.692*** -1.541*** 
  (-20.55) (-16.92) (-19.80)  (-7.951) (-7.255) (-7.727) 
Industry Median Return  0.321 0.549 0.324  0.424 0.543 0.387 
  (0.668) (0.949) (0.643)  (0.693) (0.747) (0.623) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -1.386 -1.343 -1.494  -0.686 -0.646 -0.692 
  (-1.377) (-1.151) (-1.498)  (-0.494) (-0.384) (-0.492) 
Customer Leverage  0.296 0.134 1.144  2.347 1.542 1.702 
  
(0.130) (0.0589) (0.503)  (0.867) (0.576) (0.612) 
Customer Average Return  -1.059*** -1.134*** -1.001***  -0.582*** -0.686*** -0.559*** 
  (-7.198) (-6.857) (-6.568)  (-2.855) (-2.890) (-2.718) 
Extrapolation Indicator  -0.762    -1.200*   
  (-1.358)    (-1.681)   
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs.  9,937 6,380 9,421  10,043 6,453 9,899 
R-sqr Within   0.214 0.224 0.210   0.078 0.094 0.075 
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Table A4: Matched Firm Comparison: Difference-in-Differences Sample  
The original sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated 
in the U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not 
themselves referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. From the original sample, we 
construct a matched sample of treated and control suppliers as follows: (1) A treated supplier is defined as having 
CDS-referenced customer(s) in the third and fourth years (t and t+1) of a four-year window and having no CDS-
referenced customer(s) in the first and second years (t-2 and t-1). (2) A control supplier is defined as having no 
CDS-referenced customers throughout a four-year window. (3) A control supplier is matched with a treated supplier 
in year t-1 of the four-year window if they are in the same two-digit SIC industry and their Total Assets and 
Customer Z-Score are the closest to each other among all potential matches. The table reports the mean Total Assets, 
Customer Z-Score, Market Leverage, and Book Leverage of the treated and control groups before (t-1) and after (t+1) 
the treatment year (t), respectively, as well as the t-statistics that test the differences in means. Total Assets is the 
natural log of total assets, i.e., ln(at). Customer Z-Score is the average Z-score of each customer weighted by sales to 
the customer. Market Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of the 
market value of assets, i.e., (dltt+dlc)/(prcc_f*csho+at-ceq-txdb)*100. Book Leverage is the sum of long-term debt 
and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of total assets, i.e., (dltt+dlc)/at*100. 
    Before (t-1) After (t+1) t-statistic 
Total Assets Treated 4.839 5.007 -1.766 
 
Control 4.794 4.889 -1.126 
 
t-statistic 0.513 1.271 
 
     Customer Z-Score Treated 6.622 4.558 5.814 
 
Control 5.203 4.343 3.776 
 
t-statistic 3.516 1.056 
 
     Market Leverage Treated 0.135 0.139 -0.316 
 
Control 0.130 0.161 -2.648 
  t-statistic 0.507 -1.837   
     Book Leverage Treated 0.185 0.190 -0.302 
 
Control 0.174 0.204 -2.221 
 
t-statistic 0.908 -0.974 
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Table A5: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Matched Sample with Long-Term Customers 
The original sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated 
in the U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not 
themselves referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. From the original sample, we select a 
matched sample of treated and control suppliers where a control supplier is matched to a treated supplier if they are 
in the same two-digit SIC industry and their Total Assets and Customer Z-Score are closest to each other among all 
potential matches, while a treated (control) supplier has (does not have) a customer that has CDS introduced in the 
third year (any year) during a four-year window of relationship with the supplier. Panel A reports the mean Total 
Assets, Customer Z-Score, Market Leverage, and Book Leverage of the treated and control groups before (t-1) and 
after (t+1) the treatment year (t), respectively, as well as the t-statistics that test the differences in means. Total 
Assets is the natural log of total assets, i.e., ln(at). Customer Z-Score is the average Z-score of each customer 
weighted by sales to the customer. Market Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities as a 
percentage of the market value of assets, i.e., (dltt+dlc)/(prcc_f*csho+at-ceq-txdb)*100. Book Leverage is the sum 
of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of total assets, i.e., (dltt+dlc)/at*100. Panel B reports 
the regression results on the matched sample with long-term customers. The dependent variable is Market Leverage 
in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The variables are defined in Table 2. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Matched sample comparison 
    Before (t-1) After (t+1) t-statistic 
Total Assets Treated 4.632 4.817 -0.776 
 
Control 4.519 4.723 -0.924 
 
t-statistic 0.514 0.393 
 
     Customer Z-Score Treated 6.568 5.790 1.182 
 
Control 6.414 5.834 0.870 
 
t-statistic 0.216 -0.073 
 
     Market Leverage Treated 0.157 0.123 1.114 
 
Control 0.079 0.106 -1.170 
  t-statistic 2.757 0.624   
     Book Leverage Treated 0.188 0.176 0.304 
 
Control 0.116 0.156 -1.456 
 
t-statistic 2.116 0.579 
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Panel B. Regressions on the matched sample 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -13.00*** -9.795**  -6.578 -3.793 
  (-3.247) (-2.164)  (-1.636) (-0.912) 
Industry Median Leverage  5.397 6.784  -1.682 -0.527 
  (0.267) (0.389)  (-0.134) (-0.0501) 
Market-to-Book  -0.311 -0.354  -0.517 -0.514 
  (-0.758) (-0.967)  (-1.032) (-1.104) 
Fixed Assets  19.61 28.70**  -8.183 2.538 
  (1.514) (2.036)  (-0.457) (0.128) 
Profitability  -2.248 -1.370  0.196 -1.584 
  (-0.382) (-0.237)  (0.0349) (-0.279) 
Total Assets  9.377*** 11.43***  7.618** 10.07*** 
  (2.768) (4.242)  (2.548) (4.208) 
Earnings Volatility  -5.103 5.219  -5.037 3.392 
  (-0.473) (0.464)  (-0.625) (0.388) 
Loss Carry-Forward  2.982*** 3.316**  3.212*** 3.339*** 
  (3.016) (2.553)  (4.503) (3.437) 
Change of EPS  -2.454 -2.724  -3.163* -1.981 
  (-1.222) (-1.421)  (-1.695) (-1.004) 
Rated  5.492 4.665  22.77 21.80 
  (0.420) (0.402)  (1.249) (1.310) 
12-Month Stock Return  -2.106*** -2.176***  -1.017 -1.275 
  (-3.039) (-3.123)  (-1.153) (-1.381) 
Industry Median Return  1.303 0.736  1.986 2.934 
  (0.955) (0.336)  (1.103) (1.435) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -7.602 -4.875  -8.800* -1.442 
  (-1.513) (-0.980)  (-1.800) (-0.279) 
Customer Leverage  -16.25 -12.06  -9.003 -9.521 
 
 (-1.116) (-0.703)  (-1.098) (-1.082) 
Customer Average Return  -0.827 -1.016**  -0.538 -0.694 
  (-1.628) (-2.025)  (-0.964) (-1.321) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  267 267  267 267 
R-sqr Within   0.353 0.408   0.264 0.347 
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Table A6: First Stage of the Instrumental Variable Regression 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is % Sales to Customers 
with CDS. Industry Median Leverage refers to market leverage and book leverage in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. The excluded instruments are FX Derivatives Use by Customers' Lenders and % Sales to Customers w/ 
Concentrated Lenders. FX Derivatives Use by Customers’ Lenders is constructed as follows. For each customer firm, 
we compute the average amount of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging purposes relative to the total 
assets of the bank holding companies of the banks serving as the customer firm’s lead lenders or bond underwriters 
in the past five years. Then, we sum this value across all of the customer firms of a given supplier. % Sales to 
Customers with Concentrated Lenders is defined as sales to customers with concentrated lenders as a proportion of 
the supplier's total sales. A customer is considered to have concentrated lenders if the average Herfindahl index of 
its lenders' loan portfolio industry-state concentration is above its annual sample median. The other variables are 
defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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    Market Leverage Book Leverage 
    (1) (2) 
% Sales to Customers w/ Concentrated Lenders  0.229*** 0.228*** 
  (8.75) (8.81) 
FX Derivatives Use by Customers' Lenders  1.119*** 1.142*** 
  (4.64) (4.74) 
Industry Median Leverage  -0.0116 -0.0097 
  (-0.52) (-0.47) 
Market-to-Book  -0.0013 -0.0012 
  (-0.97) (-0.91) 
Fixed Assets  0.0081 0.0044 
  (0.38) (0.21) 
Profitability  0.030** 0.029** 
  (2.43) (2.39) 
Total Assets  0.0015 0.0015 
  (0.41) (0.41) 
Earnings Volatility  0.0134 0.0123 
  (0.56) (0.52) 
Loss Carry-Forward  -0.0013 -0.0011 
  (-0.58) (-0.49) 
Change of EPS  -0.0048 -0.0048 
  (-1.51) (-1.52) 
Rated  -0.013* -0.012** 
  (-1.77) (-1.73) 
12-Month Stock Return  0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.63) (0.64) 
Industry Median Return  0.0014 0.0013 
  (0.28) (0.28) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   0.087*** 0.086*** 
  (10.05) (9.98) 
Customer Leverage  0.050* 0.053** 
  
(1.74) (2.24) 
Customer Average Return  0.0029 0.0028 
  (1.64) (1.60) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  9,137 9,235 
R-sqr    0.32 0.32 
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Table A7: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: 
Alternative Measures of Trade-Relationship-Specific Exposure 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
column (1) and Book Leverage in column (2). Low (High) Total Receivables equals 1 if accounts receivable scaled 
by total assets is below or equal to (above) the annual sample median. Low (High) Share of Critical Customers 
equals 1 if the average sales to each critical customer divided by total sales is below or equal to (above) the annual 
sample median. Low (High) Relationship Concentration equals 1 if the sum of the squared ratio of sales to each 
critical customer to total sales is below or equal to (above) the annual sample median. Diversified (Concentrated) 
Customer Industries equals 1 if the Herfindahl index of the supplier industry's output used by downstream industries 
(based on the 2002 Input-Output tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) is below or equal to (above) the 
sample median. The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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  Market Leverage Book Leverage 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A:   % Sales to Customers w/ CDS * High Total Receivables -4.573*** -8.203*** 
(-2.662) (-3.272) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Low Total Receivables -3.101* -3.709 
(-1.720) (-1.360) 
# Obs. 9,773 9,877 
R-sqr Within 0.211 0.077 
Panel B:   
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * High Share of Critical Customers -3.953*** -6.329*** 
 (-2.721) (-2.803) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Low Share of Critical Customers -2.923 -2.458 
 (-1.180) (-0.760) 
# Obs. 9,937 10,043 
R-sqr Within 0.214 0.078 
Panel C:  % Sales to Customers w/ CDS * High Relationship Concentration -3.807*** -6.020*** 
(-2.637) (-2.735) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Low Relationship Concentration -3.995 -1.449 
(-1.180) (-0.340) 
# Obs. 9,937 10,043 
R-sqr Within 0.214 0.079 
Panel D:  
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Concentrated Customer Industries -3.974** -5.912** 
 (-2.498) (-2.233) % Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Diversified Customer Industries -3.059 -4.543 
(-1.420) (-1.550) 
# Obs. 9,791 9,895 
R-sqr Within 0.217 0.083 
   
Other Controls  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table A8: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Supplier Idiosyncratic Volatility 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The column labeled High (Low) Volatility 
reports regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose idiosyncratic volatility is above (below) the annual 
sample median. Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated by fitting stock returns in the previous 60 months to the Fama-
French three-factor model. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in 
columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  High Volatility Low Volatility  High Volatility Low Volatility 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -5.531*** -2.574  -7.101** -3.338 
  (-2.606) (-1.169)  (-2.183) (-1.176) 
       
Other Controls   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  4,872 4,844  4,929 4,892 
R-sqr Within   0.193 0.244   0.072 0.080 
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Table A9: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Customer Credit Rating 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The column labeled IG (Non-IG) reports 
regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose average customer S&P credit rating is above or equal to 
BBB- (below BBB- or unrated). The dependent variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book 
Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  IG Non-IG  IG Non-IG 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -0.390 -4.447**  4.306 -7.725** 
  (-0.143) (-1.996)  (1.366) (-2.495) 
       
Other Controls   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  992 8,945  1,000 9,043 
R-sqr Within   0.329 0.207   0.172 0.075 
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Table A10: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Supplier Financial Flexibility 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. In Panel A, the column labeled Non-Payer (Payer) 
reports regression results on the subsample of suppliers that do not pay (do pay) dividends. In Panel B, the column 
labeled High SA (Low SA) reports regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose SA index (Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010) is above or equal to (below) the annual sample median. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The control variables (not reported) are the same as 
in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Supplier Paying Dividends: No vs. Yes 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  Non-Payer Payer  Non-Payer Payer 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -4.274** -1.145  -7.604*** 0.292 
  (-2.336) (-0.549)  (-2.722) (0.0965) 
       
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  6,972 2,951  7,046 2,983 
R-sqr Within   0.216 0.240   0.088 0.072 
 
Panel B. Supplier SA Index: High vs. Low 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  High SA Low SA  High SA Low SA 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -4.874** -1.925  -6.742** -2.164 
  (-2.242) (-0.927)  (-1.974) (-0.768) 
       
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  4,631 5,306  4,664 5,379 
R-sqr Within   0.180 0.247   0.076 0.107 
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Table A11: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage:  
Supplier Growth Opportunities 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. In Panel A, the column labeled High Growth 
(Low Growth) reports regression results on the subsample of suppliers whose sales growth is above or equal to 
(below) the annual sample median. In Panel B, the column labeled High Q (Low Q) reports regression results on the 
subsample of suppliers whose Tobin’s Q is above or equal to (below) the annual sample median. The dependent 
variable is Market Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). The control variables 
(not reported) are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Supplier Sales Growth: High vs. Low 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  High Growth Low Growth  High Growth Low Growth 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -0.642 -6.685***  -1.988 -9.812*** 
  (-0.301) (-3.016)  (-0.686) (-3.018) 
       
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  4,827 5,098  4,882 5,149 
R-sqr Within   0.211 0.217   0.078 0.089 
 
Panel B. Supplier Tobin's Q: High vs. Low 
    Market Leverage   Book Leverage 
  High Q Low Q  High Q Low Q 
    (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -2.393 -5.368**  -3.791 -6.855** 
  (-1.424) (-2.175)  (-1.074) (-2.558) 
       
Other Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  4,798 5,139  4,847 5,196 
R-sqr Within   0.155 0.282   0.058 0.111 
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Table A12: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Operating Performance 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Sales Growth and 
Profitability in columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively. Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales, i.e., 
[sale(t)-sale(t-1)]/sale(t-1). Profitability is EBIT scaled by total assets, i.e., oiadp/at. Industry Median Sales Growth 
and Industry Median Profitability are the annual median Sales Growth and Profitability of the supplier’s three-digit 
SIC industry, respectively. The other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
firm level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
    Sales Growth   Profitability 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -0.0591 -0.0546  0.0238 0.0297 
  (-0.866) (-0.765)  (1.036) (1.286) 
Industry Median Sales Growth  0.0118** 0.00433  
    (2.038) (0.579)    Industry Median Profitability     0.0683** 0.0505 
     (2.183) (1.565) 
Lagged Sales Growth  -0.0991*** -0.101***  -0.00351 -0.00324 
  (-7.042) (-7.114)  (-0.827) (-0.756) 
Market-to-Book  0.0542*** 0.0504***  0.0129*** 0.0125*** 
  (9.271) (8.731)  (6.606) (6.349) 
Fixed Assets  -0.252*** -0.213**  0.0225 0.0235 
  (-2.821) (-2.306)  (0.789) (0.817) 
Lagged Profitability  -0.463*** -0.484***  0.297*** 0.296*** 
  (-8.459) (-8.891)  (12.03) (11.88) 
Total Assets  -0.0522*** -0.0555***  0.00818* 0.0100* 
  (-3.736) (-3.487)  (1.867) (1.943) 
Earnings Volatility  -0.480*** -0.477***  0.153*** 0.163*** 
  (-4.935) (-4.843)  (4.076) (4.287) 
12-Month Stock Return  0.101*** 0.104***  0.0470*** 0.0499*** 
  (15.01) (14.50)  (20.66) (20.78) 
Industry Median Return  0.0668*** 0.0526**  0.0107** 0.00405 
  (4.306) (2.568)  (2.222) (0.628) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   0.0605 0.0598  -0.0257** -0.0252** 
  (1.452) (1.437)  (-2.099) (-2.045) 
Customer Leverage  -0.0955 0.0160  -0.0408* -0.0221 
  
(-1.372) (0.213)  (-1.719) (-0.889) 
Customer Average Return  0.0626*** 0.0684***  0.0116*** 0.0129*** 
  (8.270) (9.003)  (5.125) (5.629) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes  No Yes 
# Obs.  16,012 16,012  16,059 16,059 
R-sqr Within   0.110 0.120   0.151 0.155 
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Table A13: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Debt Maturity 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Debt Maturity, which 
is the weighted average debt maturity, i.e., [6*(dltt-dd2-dd3-dd4-dd5) + 5*dd5 + 4*dd4 + 3*dd3 + 2*dd2 + 
1*dlc]/(dltt+dlc). Industry Median Maturity is the annual median Debt Maturity of the supplier’s three-digit SIC 
industry. The other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
    Debt Maturity 
    (1) (2) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS  -0.555** -0.350 
  (-2.507) (-1.527) 
Industry Median Maturity  0.0958*** 0.0931** 
  (2.767) (2.557) 
Book Leverage  0.0979 0.0222 
  (0.539) (0.124) 
Market-to-Book  0.0368 0.0348 
  (1.584) (1.467) 
Fixed Assets  0.704** 0.567* 
  (2.131) (1.714) 
Profitability  0.123 0.0183 
  (0.694) (0.104) 
Total Assets  0.212*** 0.373*** 
  (3.630) (5.477) 
Earnings Volatility  -0.230 -0.125 
  (-0.571) (-0.298) 
Loss Carry-Forward  0.0155 0.0582 
  (0.390) (1.409) 
Change of EPS  0.0203 0.0218 
  (0.495) (0.533) 
Rated  0.218 0.216 
  (1.373) (1.385) 
12-Month Stock Return  0.0157 0.00872 
  (0.705) (0.373) 
Industry Median Return  0.0493 0.0295 
  (0.841) (0.390) 
% Sales to Critical Customers   -0.243* -0.193 
  (-1.683) (-1.346) 
Customer Leverage  0.0644 0.148 
  
(0.205) (0.453) 
Customer Average Return  -0.00841 -0.00446 
  (-0.323) (-0.170) 
Customer Rating Dummies  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  No Yes 
# Obs.  6,278 6,278 
R-sqr Within   0.024 0.038 
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Table A14: Effect of Customer CDS Status on Supplier Leverage: Credit Crowd-Out 
The sample comprises firms in the Compustat Segments files that report critical customers, are incorporated in the 
U.S., have common stock covered by the CRSP, are not in the financial or utility industries, and are not themselves 
referenced by CDS. The sample period is between 1997 and 2008. The dependent variable is Market Leverage in 
columns (1) and (2) and Book Leverage in columns (3) and (4). Common Lender is defined as follows. If the 
supplier has CDS-referenced customers, the dummy variable equals 1 if the supplier and any of the CDS-referenced 
customers have any syndicate lead lenders in common and 0 otherwise. If the supplier has no CDS-referenced 
customers, the dummy variable equals 1 if the supplier and any of its customers have any syndicate lead lenders in 
common and 0 otherwise. Different Lender equals 1- Common Lender. The control variables (not reported) are the 
same as in Table 3. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    Market Leverage Book Leverage 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Different Lender  -2.931 -4.295 
  (-1.015) (-1.180) 
% Sales to Customers w/ CDS * Common Lender  0.355 2.241 
  (0.070) (0.400) 
    
Other Controls   Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
# Obs.  1,944 1,969 
R-sqr Within   0.344 0.190 
 
 
